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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The Attribution of Intentionality in Relation to 
Culture and Self 
by 
Gangaw Zaw 
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Psychology 
Loma Linda University, June 2006 
Dr. Hector Betancourt, Chairperson 
The attribution of intentionality has received significant attention in the social 
cognition literature (Malle, 1999). Perceiving the intentions of others has several 
implications for how individuals judge and respond to others' behaviors in various social 
situations. The current study examined factors that predict attributions of intentionality. 
Studies by Jones and Davis (1965) have indicated the role of culture is involved in 
perceptions of intentionality. In addition, studies in philosophy have implicated the self as 
influential in the perception of intentionality. The self is also a product of culture and 
cultural value orientations (e.g. individualism and collectivism). Markus and Kitayama 
(1991) identified two construals of the self (e.g. independent and interdependent) that are 
influenced by culture. The current study examined how cultural value orientations of 
individualism and collectivism and related beliefs about the self may influence the 
attribution of intentionality. A Structural Equation model was proposed to explain the 
hypothesized relations among the variables in a conflict situation. Specifically, it was 
expected the cultural value orientations would be directly related to the perception 
intentionality, and indirectly through the construal of the self. The model testing the 
hypothesized and theoretically based relations among the variables was confirmed, x2(24, 
224)— 74.13,p= .00, CFI = .95, RMSEA= .10. The initial results indicated collectivism 
and individualism influenced the interdependent and independent construal of the self, 
respectively; however, these variables did not predict the attribution of intentionality. 
Additional models tested showed that a model incorporating locus of control and 
controllability improved the fit of the original model, x2 (69, 224)= 125.03,p= .00, (CFI) 
= .95, RMSEA= .06. These results demonstrated that cultural value. orientation and the 
construal of the self indirectly influenced the perception of intentionality through the 
locus and controllability. 
xi 
The Attribution of Intentionality in Relation to 
Culture and Self 
Intentionality has received significant attention in the social cognition literature in 
recent years (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). The literature on the study of 
intentionality extends from attributions of intentionality in violence and aggression 
(Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Guthrie, 2002), to the development of intentionality within 
the paradigm of "theory of mind"(Brandtstater & Lerner, 1999) and philosophical 
approaches on intentions and intentionality (Bandura, 2001; Casey & O'Connell, 1999; 
Malesevic, 2002; Malle, 1999; Sawyer, 2002;). Many studies from developmental and 
philosophical literatures have considered intentionality to be beliefs that motivate various 
actions and outcomes by particular individuals. Attribution theorists have studied 
intentionality in terms of how people perceive intentionality in others' behaviors in 
various social contexts (Jones & Davis, 1965; Weiner, 1995). The perception of 
intentionality, defined as the belief that another person's actions are purposeful regardless 
Of outcome, has implications for how people feel, make judgments of blame and 
responsibility, and deliver punishment to those individuals whose behaviors are perceived 
as intentional (Weiner, 1995). As the perception of ill intent can lead to various negative 
outcomes in a multicultural world, it becomes essential to understand how sociocultural 
and dispositional factors influence the perception of intentionality. One of the aims of 
the present study is to understand how two factors, cultural orientation (e.g. individualism 
and collectivism) and dispositional factors (construals of self) may influence the 
perception of intentionality. 
1 
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Culture is one factor shown to influence intentionality (Brandstater & Lerner, 
1999). Jones and Davis's (1965) correspondent inference theory on the attribution of 
intentionality highlights the importance of social factors that influence the perception of 
intentionality. The social factors Jones and Davis (1965) discuss concern social 
desirability, social roles, and prior expectations, all of which are dictated by the rules, 
norms, and values within a particular sociocultural context. As interest in culture within 
the field of psychology was not prevalent at the time of Jones and Davis's research, 
specific aspects of cultural value orientations that may influence intentional thinking 
were not clarified. In line with the zeitgeist for studying culture in human behavior, it is 
essential that researchers identify and measure specific aspects of culture that influence 
psychological processes (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). The particular cultural variables 
relevant to the study of intentionality involve individualism and collectivism, two 
constructs that describe a particular orientation toward either the self or the group 
(Kemmerling, 2001; Sawyer, 2002). The contributions from the field of philosophy 
suggest that people socialized in collectivistic or individualistic cultures are likely to 
experience intentional states differently. In turn, how they perceive the intentionality of 
others in their group is also likely to be different. 
When specific aspects of culture have been identified, some researchers have 
found cultural values (e.g. individualism and collectivism) have direct and indirect effects 
on certain behaviors (Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & Heyman, 
1996; Singelis & Brown, 1995). One of the indirect factors includes the construal of the 
self (independent or interdependent) identified by Markus and Kitayama (1991). The 
individualism construct corresponds to the independent self, whereas the collectivism 
3 
construct corresponds to the interdependent self Typically, the role the self-construal 
construct plays is an intermediary between cultural value orientation and specific 
psychological phenomena (e.g. attributions). 
When attribution processes were examined in relation to self and culture, the 
specific processes examined were limited to causal attributions of dispositionai versus 
situational properties (Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 2001). The attributions of 
intentionality have not been examined within the domain of self. This may be partly 
because the self-construal studies stemmed from cultural psychological research, which 
were a marginalized topic during Jones and Davis's era. However, on a more intuitive 
level, another possible reason for the lack of studying these relations between self and 
intentionality could be that the essence of intentionality itself (regardless of perceiving 
intentionality or personal desires) already assumes that an agent (the self) is involved. 
Brandstater and Lerner (1999), Mascolo, Fischer, and Neimeyer (1999) proposed that any 
complete understanding of intentionality automatically implicates the self (agency) The 
purpose of studying the relation between the self and intentionality is essential, given that 
there are two construals of the self (i.e. independent and interdependent). As there are 
broad variations in cultural value orientation, variations in the construal of the self, a 
closer examination of the relations among cultural value orientation, construal of the self, 
and the attribution of intentionality are necessary to understand interpersonal 
relationships in a multicultural and interpersonal context. 
The central aim of this research is to examine cultural and dispositional factors 
that influence the attributions of intentionality when a negative social event occurs 
between two people. This study will directly measure aspects of culture (i.e. 
individualism and collectivism) in relation to the attribution of intentionality.  
Additionally, because culture tends to be a broader factor predicting several 
psychological outcomes, this study will also measure specific beliefs about the self that 
are associated with individualism and collectivism, as intermediary factors influencing 
the attribution of intentionality. To achieve the central aim, this study was designed to 
answer the following research questions: 1) How do cultural value orientations of 
collectivism or individualism influence perceptions of intentionality and how strong are 
the relations between the two constructs, 2) How do individual beliefs about the self as 
independent or interdependent relate to the individual's attribution of intentionality, 3) 
How do individual beliefs about the self as independent or interdependent relate to 
individualism and collectivism in influencing the individual's attribution of 
intentionality? A model including the hypothesized and theory-based relations among 
cultural value orientation and construal of the self as determinants of the perception of 
intentionality is proposed (see Figure 1). This model depicts that the perception of 
intentionality is predicted directly by cultural orientation and indirectly through the 
beliefs about the self Thus, the self is expected to mediate the relations between culture 
and the perception of intentionality. 
Figure 1. Hypothesized Model: The influence of culture and beliefs about self on the 
attribution of intentionality. 
4 
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The following sections of this paper will first review attribution theory. In 
general, the significance of studying the attribution of intentionality and how culture is 
relevant will be discussed. Then it will examine how the elements of individualism and 
collectivism relate to intentionality. The section following will explore the role of the 
self-construal in intentionality and the perception of intentionality. It will then 
summarize how the specific aspects of culture (e.g. individualism and collectivism) affect 
personal beliefs about the self (e.g. independent and or interdependent) and the attribution 
of intentionality. Finally, the paper will propose a model describing the relations of 
culture, self, and perceived intent. 
Attribution Theory and Intentionality 
Historically, the concept of intentionality has been studied by social scientists 
including philosophers, developmental psychologists, and social psychologists studying 
attribution theory. While philosophical approaches (Glock, 2001; McGeer & Petit, 2002) 
and some developmental studies (e.g. Brandstater & Lerner, 1999) on intentionality have 
focused on the intentionality of individuals' goal directed behaviors, attribution theory 
has emphasized how individuals perceive the intentionality of others' behaviors. In 
general, and for the purposes of this paper, the attribution of intentionality is defined by 
the belief that another person's actions were nonaccidental and purposeful regardless of 
the outcome of the behavior (Flavell & Miller, 1998). As this current study is concerned 
with the perception of intentionality in others, this section will review the importance of 
attribution theory. In particular, the attribution of intentionality and factors that may 
influence this attribution will be discussed. 
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Within attribution theory, foundational work by Heider (1958), Jones and Davis 
(1965), and Weiner (1986) have led to a better understanding of how individuals make 
sense of and explain their social worlds. These founding fathers of attribution theory 
believed when negative and unexpected events occurred in the environment, individuals 
were motivated to search for the causes of these events. Essentially, attribution processes 
have implications for how one feels and responds to his or her environment (Weiner, 
1995). Additionally, how one makes an inference about another's action often plays a 
role in the social evaluation of blame, responsibility and punishment of the other (Malle, 
Moses & Baldwin, 2001; Weiner, 1995). 
Various attribution processes have been studied in relation to several social 
psychological domains. The attribution processes such as controllable versus 
uncontrollable, and locus of control (i.e. situational versus dispositional) have been 
studied within the domains of interpersonal attraction, achievement motivation, helping 
behaviors, and aggression (see Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Some studies have even looked at 
cultural influence on perceiving situational versus dispositional attributions (Knowles et 
al., 2001; Morris, Menon, Chiu, & Hong, 1999). Typically, collectivism has been found 
to be associated with situational attributions, while individualism was associated with 
dispositional attributions. 
It appears in Morris et al., 1999, Knowles et al., 2001 that the legacy of Heider 
(1958) on situational versus dispositional causal attributions, and Weiner's (1995) 
emphasis on controllability have dominated attribution research within social psychology. 
One result of the emphasis on the attributions of dispositions and controllability is that 
studies on the attribution of intentionality have been neglected in social psychological 
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and attribution research. For instance, Weiner (1995) explained that judgments of 
responsibility first require a distinction between the person and the situation in terms of 
causality. After attributing dispositional causality, an assessment of control, is made and 
if there are no mitigating circumstances, the person is held responsible. Assessing 
intentionality only becomes important after assessing the degree of responsibility to 
which the person is held accountable. For Weiner (2001), controllability precedes 
intentionality and intentionality is a subordinate concept in relation to responsibility. 
However, Malle (1999) contends that often intentionality is equated with dispositional 
(internal locus) causality. These two concepts, however, are not the same because 
dispositional attributions tend to refer to personality traits, and attribution of 
intentionality refers to the mental structures underlying an action. 
Attribution studies on controllability versus uncontrollability, disposition versus 
situation, while sound and viable, do not address underlying mental structures like 
perceiving intentionality in others. Both the perception of controllability and locus of 
control are broad by focusing on the causes of an action, without much consideration for 
the mental structures underlying that action. This may be because perceiving the 
underlying intentions of others cannot be as easily recognized in the social environment 
as much as observing social cues in the environment that cause a person to act (Rosati, 
Knowles, Kalish, Gobnik, Ames, & Morris, 2001). Individuals may be more likely to 
evaluate and report causes of events and behaviors to factors that are more observable in 
the social environment. Whether it may be that lay individuals do not readily report 
attributions of intentionality, or attribution researchers may not have directly assessed for 
intentionality, the attributions of intentionality is ignored in attribution research 
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Rosati et al. (2001) believe one reason attribution of intentionality has been 
ignored is that social psychologists lack a shared language about the perceiver's mental 
  
representations of others' mental states (i.e. others' intentional states). These authors 
believe attribution research should delve deeper into understanding the intentionality of 
others because "reading" each other's minds and understanding the underlying mental 
states of others occur in everyday interactions. However, when individuals are asked, 
"why do you think the person to acted in that way", the language used to describe the 
reason becomes confounded with personality traits or dispositional factors (e.g. he/she 
was stupid, angry, clumsy, immature, etc.). While these descriptions may indicate 
internal/dispositional factors, they do not indicate the perception of the underlying mental 
  
cause (i.e. intentionality). Perceiving intentionality in others is much different from 
perceiving dispositional causality. This is because attributing dispositional causes to a 
person's behavior occurs more readily and does not delve deeply enough into the 
understanding of the underlying mental state. 
When a person is involved in an action, typically assumptions about that 
individual's dispositions are made. However, these assumptions regarding others 
dispositional qualities are not sufficient to judge or impose social consequences for their 
actions. Rather intentionality of the individual's actions plays a role in judgment and 
imposition of social consequences for the actions. 
Casey and O'Connell (1999) demonstrated that the penalties for perpetrators were 
rated higher when the intentions of the perpetrators were clear. Betancourt and Blair 
(1992) found that perceiving the intentionality of a perpetrator resulted in a more violent 
response by the respondent. Betancourt and Guthrie (2000) revealed that third and sixth 
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grade children responded in more competitive ways with an instigator when an 
instigator's behavior was perceived to be intentional. It seems when the individuals are 
directly asked about the intentions of others; it becomes apparent that the attribution of 
intentionality in others' behaviors is evaluated. This evaluation of intentionality in turn 
influences how individuals respond. Human social interactions are rich with perceiving 
intentionality of others' actions, partly because perceiving intentionality in others brings 
order and structure for the perceivers to make sense of and explain the complex stream of 
human behaviors, and direct us in how to respond based on the beliefs about others' 
mental states (Malle et. al., 2001). 
Even though studies on intentions and intentionality have been limited in 
attribution research, they are not entirely new to the field. Jones and Davis's (1965) early 
  
work on correspondent inference theory held the assumption that when making 
inferences about people, the behavior of the other person will be most informative when 
judged to be intentional (i.e. if the person believed the action was produced by a 
consistent underlying intention). One main contribution of these authors was that 
inferring intentionality precedes the perception of dispositional or situational attributions 
(Rosati et al., 2001). Jones and Davis (1965) believed there was a process individuals 
experienced before they attributed a dispositional cause to somebody's behaviors. 
The process Jones and Davis referred to involves the analysis of "noncommon 
effects," that is, when social perceivers realize there is more than one course of action an 
actor can take, perceivers ask what the individual got out of doing a specific behavior 
rather than an alternative behavior. In other words, what was the distinctive consequence 
of an actor's chosen course of action? Jones and Davis also contended that individuals 
10 
rely on other social cues before inferring dispositional or situational causation because 
evaluations of the "noncommon effects" produce ambiguous conclusions about the 
underlying mental state. The other social factors relied on before inferring dispositional 
or situational causation included choice, social desirability, social role, and prior 
expectations. Jones and Davis believed that behaviors perceived as undesirable violate 
social roles (norms), and prior expectations lead perceivers to conclude an intention 
underlying a behavior. These authors further contended that perceiving dispositional 
attributions immediately followed this perception of intent. Additionally, dispositions 
were also assumed when the behavior was out of the actor's usual social role and the 
behavior violated prior expectations. According to Jones and Davis (1965), intentionality 
automatically assumed dispositions of the person, and in the course of their work, they 
eventually equated intentionality with dispositional attributions. However, the most 
important aspect of their theory was that these social cues were used to infer the 
underlying intentions of the other before attributions of locus of control and 
controllability were assessed. 
Hence, it seems there are two theoretical links in how attribution processes of 
locus of control, controllability and intentionality function. Whereas Weiner's (1995) 
formulation of how attribution processes function in relation to intentionality would be: 
Social event-)disposition or situation attribution-4 controllable or uncontrollab1e-4 
judgment of responsibility-4 judgments of intententionality, Jones and Davis's 
formulation would be: Social event-attention to the social 
context->intentiona1ity4disposition or situation attribution -÷ controlled or 
uncontrolled -÷ judgment of responsibility. Jones and Davis's formulation takes into 
account the importance of the social context. Even though they considered the 
  
importance of the social context, they did not specify what behaviors were considered 
socially undesirable in a given socio-cultural context, which defined rules for desirable 
and undesirable social behaviors (e.g. conflict). For example, there are variations in how 
collectivist and individualist cultures view conflict (Hofstede, 2001). Collectivist 
cultures consider conflict as something undesirable and something to be avoided, whereas 
individualist cultures tend to view conflict as a situation to re-negotiate current 
relationships (Itoi, Ohbuchi, Fukuno, 1996; Pearson & Stephan, 1998). If the social 
  
values of collectivist cultures involve viewing conflict as undesirable, there may also be a 
1 
difference in how cultural value orientations affect attributions of intentionality. 
To summarize, current attribution research mainly has foeused on attribution 
processes that concern disposition versus situational causes, controlled and uncontrolled 
causes. In effect, attribution theory has neglected the importance of the perception of 
intentionality in social cognition research. The role intentionality has been given in 
attribution research is subordinate. Perceptions of intentionality have often been 
considered interchangeable with the perception of dispositional causes. The perception 
of intentionality, however, should not be ignored because everyday interactions with 
others are comprised of trying to understand the causes of each others behaviors and the 
course of action one should take in response to others' behaviors. Even in court settings 
and violent situations, knowing the individual intended to do harm results in more severe 
negative social responses and negative consequences for opponents. Although 
intentionality has virtually taken a back seat in attribution research, earlier researchers 
such as Jones and Davis (1965) have placed the perception of intentionality as preceding 
12 
the attribution of dispositional causes. Their theory calls attention to the fact that social 
perceivers are more likely to infer intentionality based on the social cues in their 
environment than make a judgment about dispositional causes. They believe the social 
cues perceivers rely on, included the social desirability of the behavior, the consistency 
with the social rple, and prior expectations of the actor's behaviors. These cues inform 
the perceivers' knowledge of the actor's underlying mental state (intentionality). 
The importance of Jones and Davis's (1965) explanations of intentionality is that 
it takes into account the reality of the socio-cultural context in which individuals are 
embedded. These authors' discussions on social desirability, social roles, and prior 
expectations direct the current research to understand what the mechanisms are that 
inform individuals about the appropriate social roles, norms and behaviors in specific 
socio-cultural settings. What is considered socially desirable and appropriate in one 
socio-cultural context is not necessarily the same in another context (for reviews, see 
Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1994; Kim, 1994). Culture, as the individual's context, then 
becomes relevant to how one perceives intentionality in others. 
Culture is the mechanism by which individuals are taught and socialized about 
the rules, norms, values, and ideals about appropriate human behaviors (Betancourt & 
Lopez, 1993; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Often individuals are expected to internalize a 
cultural value, which in turn has implications for how they feel, think, and behave 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Commonly culture dictates values about conflict, and 
responses to conflict. Yet despite cultural variations, researchers often equate culture 
with race and ethnicity, which does not explain what aspects of culture influence the 
psychological phenomena of interest. This study seeks to determine the specific aspects 
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of culture (e.g. collectivism and individualism) associated with the perception of 
intentionality. Before proposing the important aspects of culture for the perception of 
intentionality, a brief review of how this construct has been considered in other 
disciplines will be provided. The concept of intentionality has various meanings and 
implications in social psychology and philosophy. 
Intentionality: Definitions and Implications 
The conceptualization of intentionality is an elusive concept to study. In 
philosophy and in psychology the concept of intentionality is often intertwined with the 
notion of agency and self (Bandura, 2001; Brandstater & Lerner, 1999; Glock, 2001). 
When psychological research is conducted on intentionality and agency, research focuses 
on self-efficacy and motivation, which reflects the extent to which one has control to 
bring about an intention or desire through personal action (Bandura, 2001). The current 
study is not concerned with self-efficacy issues. The concentration here involves 
attributions of intentionality; trying to understand how people make sense of and 
understand the underlying mental structures,of others. 
Definitions of intentionality: Social psychological (attribution) perspective. 
Social cognition and attribution researchers have extended the concept of intentionality 
from within the person to outside the person and defined intentionality as the inference of 
whether or not the underlying mental processes of desire and beliefs were present in the 
others' behaviors (Mascolo et al., 2001). For another person's behavior to be perceived as 
intentional, Malle (1999) believed the actor must have (a) a desire for an outcome, (b) 
beliefs about a behavior leading to that outcome, (c) a resulting intention to perform that 
behavior, (d) the skill to perform the behavior, and (e) awareness of fulfilling the 
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intention while performing the behavior. All of these conditions for judging behavior as 
intentional may be relevant and considered in court settings in passing judgment and 
sentencing. However, in everyday social encounters, perception of intentionality has a 
more general meaning, which is the belief that a person's offensive behavior was done 
purposefully (Betancourt & Blair, 1992). Flavell and Miller's (1998) definition of intent 
involves two components: (a) nonaccidental behavior that is related to desires but 
differentiated from outcomes, and (b) a prior mental state of planning an action and 
believing one will carry it out. For the current study, the perception of intentionality will 
be operationalized as the belief that another person's negative social behavior is 
construed as nonaccidental and purposeful, regardless of the outcome. 
Definition of intentionality: Philosophical perspective. Intentionality has been 
conceptualized in philosophy "as the directedness of the mind towards a content or 
object" (Glock, 2001, p. 105). Philosophical work on intentionality has been devoted to 
analyzing the conceptual components of intentional action or the beliefs and desires of 
the individual that guide action (Malle, et al., 2001). The philosophical stance on 
intentionality holds that human beings are minded in a distinctively self-regulating, 
purposeful way that shows up in a broad range of activities driven by a variety of 
personal goals and desires (McGeer & Petit, 2002). McGeer and Petit (2002) described 
intentions as a mediator between desires and actions. For instance, desires may create an 
intention for a person to move toward an attractive object; disgust may create an intention 
to move away from an object. Additionally, "intentionality is the property of actions that 
makes ordinary people and scholars alike call them purposeful, meant, or done 
intentionally"(Malle et al. 2001, p. 3). When intentionality is attributed to another 
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individual, an assumption of the actions is that they are perceived to have an underlying 
mental structure that makes the behavior purposeful, meant, and done intentionally. 
Although a social psychologist, Bandura's reflections on intentionality seem more 
in line with philosophical views on intentions. Bandura (2001) suggested that an intention 
is a representation of a future course of action to be performed, with a proactive 
commitment to bringing it about. It is the exercise of agency to control a course of action 
to achieve a particular desire and goal. Bandura (2001) believed that agency (the self) 
referred to any acts done intentionally. In his conceptualization of intentions, the self 
influences intentions and intentionality, in that personal desires and needs (which create 
an intention to move toward or away from an object) identify the self This is an 
assumption made by many social science researchers. However, this assumption needs to 
be investigated further because the idea of self is no longer restricted to an autonomous 
individual. It seems that current researchers in psychology (Bandura, 2001; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1994) and philosophy (Sawyer, 2002; Tollesefen, 2002) are beginning to value 
the notion of "collective agency," "collective mindset," "collectivism," and 
"interdependent self" As such, it becomes important to understand intentionality not only 
from the perspective of personal agency, but also collective agency. How do individuals 
with "collectivist selves" affect the attribution of intentionality in other people? It is 
likely that if a person's belief about the self no longer implied an autonomous agent, 
intentionality and intentional actions within the individual would be different. 
As assumed in previous studies (Bandura, 2001; Malle, 1999), the self influences 
intentionality. However, if the self was not just an autonomous agent, but also a 
collective agent, it is likely that a person's intentional action would be affected. For 
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example, if a person was raised to attend to their own needs and desires, and to value 
being an autonomous agent, their awareness and concern for other people's needs and 
desires may not be as salient as someone that was socialized to attend to the needs of 
others. If individuals were socialized differently in how they perceive their own personal 
needs, desires and intentional states, their perceptions of intentionality in others would 
also be different. Specifically, if they were socialized to attend to the personal needs and 
desires of others, they may be more likely to see intentionality in others. Hence this 
study asks what factors might affect both the variations in perceptions of self and the 
perception of intentionality. One variable this study proposes is culture. Jones and Davis 
(1965) highlighted the importance of the sociocultural context in inferring intentionality, 
and Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that culture influenced the construal of the 
self. When studying culture, it is important to identify what about culture is thought to 
influence the psychological processes of interest (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). Therefore, 
it is important to identify specific cultural value orientations that may influence construal 
of the self as well as the perception of intentionality. 
Individual and collective mind. In philosophy, individualism has been discussed 
in terms of trying to determine if intentionality is entirely an "individualistic" concept 
(Glock, 2001). Within the philosophical discipline, it is taken for granted that the 
individual mind is real and intentional. However, what the philosophers have wrestled 
with is whether the collective social entity is real and capable of an intentional mind. As a 
consequence, contemporary philosophers denied the possibility that the collective (social) 
phenomena were real and could exert any causal power. The view that the collective 
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mind exists independent of particular individual mental states has been dismissed by most 
as absurd, dogmatic, unscientific, and even mystical (Tollefsen, 2002). 
The denial of the collective mind as a real entity with some causal powers has not 
been dismissed entirely (Kemmerling, 2001; Sawyer, 2002,Tollefsen, 2002). Tollefsen 
(2002) makes several philosophical arguments regarding how the attributions of 
intentionality toward groups are not only real but also provide us with a rich explanatory 
resource. She claims that individuals attributing intentionality to groups is not merely 
metaphorical, since there is a complex practice of attributing moral and legal 
responsibility to groups, and the social legal sanctions that groups incur are not merely 
metaphorical. The consequences that these groups face are very real in terms of social, 
economic, and political effects (Tollefesen, 2002). According to Tollefesen (2002), 
because specific social groups endure real political, social, and economic consequences, a 
collective mind with its own intentions and goals does exist independent of the individual 
mind. 
In sum, philosophical research has proposed the reality of a collective mind that is 
capable of having its own collective intentions and actions, irreducible to individual 
intentions and actions. In other words, intentionality is no longer considered an 
individualistic concept. We must consider the existence of a group mind that possesses its 
own desires and intentions and capable of acting according to the wishes of the group. 
Extending the idea of collective intentionality and individual intentionality to social 
psychological research, Bandura (2001) described the influence of collective efficacy on 
group effort and how this collective efficacy phenomenon functions similarly to his 
earlier discussions on self-efficacy. The current study, however, is not concerned with 
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collective efficacy and collective effort because these concepts tend to focus 
intentionality within the individual (or within the group). The current study is concerned 
with how the sense of collective agency or personal agency is shaped by culture. 
Additionally, it is concerned with the specific cultural value orientations that may affect 
the attribution of intentionality in others as well as the sense of personal or collective 
agency. 
Philosophical discussions on individualism and collectivism allude to cultural 
constructs of individualism and collectivism in understanding perceptions of 
intentionality. Early cultural psychologists' (e.g. Triandis et al., 1986: Hofstede, 1980) 
descriptions on the value orientations of individualism and collectivism already discussed 
differences in cultures between the East and West. Hofstede (1980) found in general, 
Eastern cultures valued the goals of the collective, whereas Western cultures valued the 
goals of the self Psychology has not directly paired these cultural constructs with 
intentionality. 
The current paper argues that if individuals are socialized differently to value 
either the self or the group goals and intentions, it is likely that how they think, feel, and 
perceive themselves as well as others' intentions and behaviors also will be different. 
Recall that Jones and Davis's (1965) research on intentionality suggested that the 
sociocultural environment influences the perception of intentionality through the 
perceiver's evaluation of the actor's behavior. The evaluation centers on whether the 
behavior is socially desirable, violating social roles or prior expectations. Before 
explaining the ways in which intentionality is thought to relate to each cultural construct, 
19 
a more thorough discussion on culture and cultural orientations of individualism and 
collectivism is warranted. 
The Study of Culture 
The study of culture in psychalogy needs elaboration because culture has 
typically inappropriately been equated with ethnicity and race. Betancourt and Lopez 
(1993) defined culture as the human-made part of the environment. They indicated 
subjective culture referred to the social roles, communication patterns, affective styles, 
and values for individualism or collectivism that were internalized within the individual 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Hence these internalized cultural value orientations can be 
amenable to measurement. Moreover, the specific elements of culture (e.g. roles and 
values) can be directly assessed (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993), and must be assessed in 
order to understand exactly what specific aspect of culture influences the individual's 
behavior. Several studies directly measured cultural value orientations and found them to 
influence a variety of behaviors, including conflict resolution styles and health-related 
behaviors (Pearson & Stephan, 1998; Zaw, 2002; McMillin, 2003; Betancourt, Hardin, & 
Manzi, 1992). 
Individualism and collectivism. One of the most common cultural dimensions 
used by cultural researchers has been the individualism and collectivism constructs. 
Societies in Western Europe and the United States have been found to be individualistic 
while societies such as those in Asia and Latin America have been associated with being 
more collectivistic (Triandis, et al., 1993). The social, ecological and political milieu of 
each society is very different. The antecedents for collectivist societies stemmed from 
resource scarcity, presence of large families, and agricultural activities that required 
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cooperation (Triandis et al., 1993). Some features of the collectivistic construct include 
conformity, interdependence within a group, sacrificing individual goals for the collective 
good and maintaining social harmony. There is also acceptance of authority from the 
homogeneous "in-groups" (Triandis et al., 1993). In-groups can be defined as "sets of 
individuals with whom a person feels similar" (Triandis, 1994, p. 43). These groups of 
individuals are bound together by a common fate or another attribute. In collectivist 
cultures, in-groups are ascribed, strictly bound by kinship, tribe, religion, village, and or 
nation (Triandis, 1994). Collectivist societies are considered cultures of relatedness 
where there is a strong maintenance of cohesive in-groups (Kim, 1994). Collectivism 
perpetuates in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism. The most important distinction about 
an individual reared in collectivist society is whether the individual is part of the in-group 
or not. Collectivist societies have firm group boundaries. An internal structure of this 
society can be described by the "relational mode," exemplified by the fluid boundaries 
among individuals that allow thoughts, ideas, and emotions to flow freely. There is an 
unspoken understanding of what others in their group need, feel, and think without it 
being stated openly. Individuals are generally socialized to be interdependent with one 
another. 
The characteristics of an individualistic society are converse to these collectivist 
themes. The discriminating factor of individualism is separation from the in-group 
(Triandis, et al., 1986). Individuals are not bound to an in-group by kinship, religion or 
village. In individualist cultures, in-group membership is achieved. Individuals are 
bound together by similar beliefs, attitudes, values, action programs, and occupation 
rather than by kinship or race (Triandis, 1994). Individualists have been socialized to be 
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autonomous and to care for their own needs. In this society, a firm boundary separates 
the individual from others and the environment. The emotional ties to any one group are 
usually temporary because the relationships tend to be contractual 	because beliefs, 
attitudes, and occupations can shift. A common feature of the individualist society 
involves more independence from family, relatives, and others. Individuals within 
individualistic cultures are encouraged to express their needs without a concern to save 
the face of their opponent in order to satisfy their own needs. However, there is greater 
concern to save one's own face in an individualistic society to protect the bounded self in 
comparison to collectivistic societies. (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991). 
To summarize, the collectivist value orientation corresponds with sustaining 
group harmony, loyalty to the in-group, respect for authority, and the downplaying of 
one's own needs in order to prioritize the needs of the group. The individualist value 
orientation corresponds with prioritizing individual needs, directly expressing these 
personal needs, and less focus and dependence on others in their culture. As these values 
are socialized within the individual, there are various implications for what people feel, 
think, and believe about the self 
In the case of the perception of intentionality, the internalization of these cultural 
value orientations are expected to show a marked difference in how one perceives intent 
in others' behaviors. In particular, it is likely that collectivism may be more likely to 
relate to attributions of intentionality than individualism. One reason is because 
collectivism places a high value on group harmony and any kind of conflict is 
unexpected, considered to be negative and undesirable; therefore, blame is assigned to the 
individual. Recall that Jones and Davis (1965) theorized that socially undesirable 
22 
behaviors tend to be more salient to perceivers. From a collectivist perspective, the 
person creating the conflict is behaving in an undesirable manner by violating social 
norms. If the instigator is an out-group member, less prior knowledge of that person is 
available, and therefore, collectivists may be more likely to assume intent underlying the 
other person's behavior. 
Moreover, the collectivist social structure demands more conformity with the 
group's ideals, needs, and goals. Individuals are not only more likely to be in tune with 
their social environment (the social collective mind), but also more invested as in-group 
members to achieve the goals of the group. In this situation, there is less room for 
individual behaviors to deviate from the goals of the group. In the collectivist social 
structure, behaviors are considered to deviate from the group, especially when a person 
expresses and prioritizes personal needs above the needs of others in the group, which 
creates conflict (Triandis, 1994). These individualistic types of behaviors are considered 
socially undesirable and violate the expectations of the other person's social roles within 
the particular collectivist social context. As Jones and Davis (1965) suggested, when 
social behaviors are judged to be undesirable, out of context, and violate social norms, 
individuals become more aware of the intentions of the actor and make more 
dispositional attributions. In this case, a person with a collectivist value orientation may 
be more likely to assume others share similar goals and expectations with him or her (i.e 
others have "good intentions for them"). When the other's behaviors suggest otherwise, 
the expectations are violated and intentionality is more likely to be ascribed. 
Zaw (2002) demonstrated that cultural value orientation affects the perception of 
intentionality in a conflict situation. Her study measured individualism and collectivism, 
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the attribution processes of controllability and intentionality in relation to conflict 
resolution preferences. It was found that collectivism was related to the perception of 
intentionality, whereas individualism was related to controllability. Additionally, 
collectivism influenced a dominating style of resolution indirectly through the perception 
of intentionality. One explanation given was that the values socialized within collectivist 
cultures (i.e. attention to others' needs and goals) influenced how the individual 
perceived the underlying mental state leading to the instigators' actions. Therefore, the 
current study will examine how collectivism specifically relates to the attribution of 
intentionality. 
The complexity of the individualism and collectivism construct. Although the 
cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism seem simple, in reality, they are 
complex. It is important to note that individualism and collectivism are not opposite ends 
of the same dimension (Triandis, 1994). Instead each construct is uni-dimensional and 
can coexist. Higher levels of individualism do not necessarily imply lower levels of 
collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Even though it may sound 
contradictory, individualism can be exhibited in a collectivist culture and vice versa. For 
example, within an individualist culture (e.g. U.S), a person may be higher on 
collectivism with his family and may be more individualistic at work. Due to the within 
cultural variations on the two constructs, Triandis and colleagues (1993) used different 
terminology to describe cultural variations at the individual level. Corresponding to 
collectivism is allocentrism, in that there is a personal tendency to define oneself in 
relation to others. Allocentrists are more likely to downplay personal goals and 
emphasize the goals of the collective. Corresponding with individualism is idiocentrism, 
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the tendency to define oneself through self-attributes. Other terms used interchangeably 
with allocentrism and idiocentrism are interdependent self-construal and the independent 
self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). As this study is concerned with the self as 
another predictor of the attribution of intentionality, the interdependent and independent 
construal of self will be assessed in relation to the cultural value orientation of 
individualism and collectivism. 
Although the individualism and collectivism constructs have been used 
commonly in cultural research, researchers have discussed problems with culture's direct 
influence on individual behaviors and cognitions (Kashima, 1989; Gudykunst et al., 
1996). Several authors (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Fiske, 2002; Kitayama, 
2002; Gudykunst, et al., 1996) have argued that studying cultural dimensions alone may 
not be sufficient to predict certain behaviors. Further, they have provided two main 
arguments. The first argument researchers have made is that broad cultural level 
tendencies alone should not be used to predict individual level behaviors (Triandis, 1994; 
Gudykunst et. al., 1996). While it is essential to identify the specific aspect of the cultural 
value orientation that differentiates psychological and behavioral processes, cultural 
value orientation is not an individual trait. Fiske (2002) believed measuring individual 
differences as if culture were a personality dimension (e.g. individualism and 
collectivism) was problematic. This is because culture is a process by which individuals 
implicitly engage in accepted social practices that may not always be in the realm of 
explicit awareness (Kitayama, 2002). A meta-analytic review on individualism and 
collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002) noted that current approaches in 
directly measuring individualism and collectivism assume the cultural frame is a form of 
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declarative knowledge, something that respondents can report on rather than a set of 
subtle and implicit practices. Subtle and implicit practices are not something respondents 
can report on because these practices are deeply woven into everyday life and a part of 
normal living. Nevertheless, because it is difficult to measure these subtle implicit 
practices, paper and pencil assessment of individualism and collectivism serve as a proxy 
for the cultural orientation the person has internalized. Measuring the cultural value 
orientation only represents the broader construct of the individual's cultural preference. It 
does not take into consideration the proximal individual factors that serve as 
intermediaries (e.g. construal of the self) between cultural value orientation and specific 
behaviors (Gudykunst et al., 1996). 
The second argument why identifying culture or cultural orientation alone is not 
sufficient is due to changes in cultural practices of various nations. Globalization is the 
current state of the world while demographics and culture are rapidly changing. 
Neglecting the rapid changes of culture tends to be problematic. In a time where 
globalization has collapsed local cultures into parts of broader global cultures, the 
intensity of the connections among various cultures and world regions has accelerated 
dramatically. The influence of globalization is not just limited to increases in economic 
and ecological areas of life worldwide, it has pervaded into changes in local cultures, 
family structures and psychological processes (e.g. ethnic identity, self concept, see 
Arnett, 2002). 
In the age of globalization, the implicit rules of culture are changing considerably, 
especially in countries such as China and Japan. Arnett (2002) cited that within the last 
two decades, these two societies, traditionally collectivistic, have been influenced by 
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economic changes and increased contact with the West. Consequently values have 
become considerably more individualistic. Arnett (2002) further contended that even the 
self-concept and social identities of individuals from once traditional rural cultures are 
changing to adapt to globalized cultures and to adopt a global identity. 
To further illustrate the effects of globalization, the meta-analytic study by 
Oyserman, et al. (2002) revealed that certain aspects of individualism and collectivism do 
not necessarily distinguish Japanese, Chinese, or Korean from American. For instance, 
the authors found certain facets of collectivism such as seeking advice from others or a 
sense of belonging did not differentiate U.S. and Hong Kong students in levels of 
collectivism. Only aspects of collectivism such as group harmony and duty to the group 
showed Americans to be lower on collectivism. Individualism also functioned in a 
similar way, showing that the difference between North American and Japanese levels of 
individualism depends on a combination of values for independence, personal 
uniqueness, personal privacy, and direct communication, but not necessarily for 
competitiveness. The implications of these findings are that globalization has blurred the 
once clear boundaries of nations distinguished by value orientations of individualism and 
collectivism. 
To summarize, there are complexities in the cultural constructs of individualism 
and collectivism. These complexities involve the within cultural variations in specific 
cultural values (e.g. individualism and collectivism). Essentially, collectivism can coexist 
within an individualist society and vice versa. Moreover, researchers (Kashima, 1989; 
Gudykunst et al., 1996) claimed the individualism and collectivism constructs are too 
broad and heterogeneous to explain differences in social behaviors. Additionally, the 
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effects of globalization have blurred the once clear boundaries of specific nations, 
cultural practices, values, and beliefs. Thus, due to the complexities, it is important that 
more proximal, personal/dispositional variables be included in the understanding of 
social cognition such as attribution processes of intentionality. As stated earlier, the 
purpose of this study is to understand cultural and personal factors that influence the 
attribution of intentionality. To this end, identifying the specific cultural value 
orientations in addition to variations in types of selves that can exist becomes critical. 
The individual level factors associated with the individualism and collectivism constructs 
are Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) conceptualization of the construal of the self, 
because the self is also relevant to studies on intentionality. 
Culture and Self 
Various authors have discussed the role of culture and its effects on the beliefs 
about the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman & Markus, 1993; Singelis & 
Brown, 1995). These authors contend that culture constitutes the core ideas and values 
reflected in key ideological and philosophical texts and institutions. These ideologies are 
implicitly and explicitly transmitted through socialization practices that include any 
social interaction between individuals. As a result of efforts to respond to or adjust to the 
set of norms established by a particular culture, a set of personalized habitual 
psychological tendencies such as the beliefs about the self develop (Markus & Kitayama, 
1994). 
Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) studies on independence and 
interdependence have been influential in understanding how culture shapes beliefs about 
the self First they described that the collective reality or core cultural ideals within a 
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culture include the values and their related ecological, historical, economic, and 
sociopolitical factors. Various nations are rich with their own histories and political 
inclinations and have developed different ideals within their own cultures. Whereas the 
U.S. ideals place emphasis on the "natural rights" of individuals, Japan and other Asian 
countries place a high value on the "social person." These cultural ideals and moral 
imperatives of a given cultural group are transmitted by a diverse set of customs, norms, 
scripts, practices and institutions that carry out the collective reality into a psychological 
reality. These norms of culture are powerful in shaping behaviors. These norms and 
practices become a lived experience in an individual's local world (e.g. home, school, 
restaurants, etc). Quite unknowingly, they live out the core cultural values and strive to 
achieve the cultural ideals. This lived experience leads to a set of habitual psychological 
tendencies—"particular, proceduralized ways of thinking, feeling, striving, knowing, 
understanding, deciding, managing, adjusting, adapting, which are in some large part 
structured, reinforced, and maintained by the constraints and affordances of the particular 
social episodes of the individual's local worlds," (Markus & Kitayama, 1994, p. 573). 
Self-construals play a major role in regulating various psychological processes (e.g. 
cognition, emotion, and motivation). Understanding the differences in construals has 
implications for how the precise role of the self mediates and regulates behavior (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991). For example, Markus and Kitayama (1991) indicate that the 
interdependent and independent self has consequences for (a) attentiveness and 
sensitivity to others, and a greater cognitive elaboration of the other or of the self-in-
relation-to other, (b) knowledge about the person (either self or other) as not abstract and 
generalized across contexts, but instead specific to the focal context. If there are 
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variations in how the construal of the self influences psychological processes as well as 
behaviors, the perception of intentionality may be also influenced by variations in the 
construal of the self. 
Independent self-construal. Consider a person brought up in U.S. or another 
Western culture. Formal institutions in the U.S. typically promote independence, self-
reliance, and self-confidence. Through daily interactions with parents, teachers, or other 
institutions, persons raised in this culture will come to believe and experience themselves 
as autonomous, decontextualized, and a bounded self, distinct from other members of the 
collective. The expectations for individuals raised in these cultures involve becoming 
independent from others and discovering and expressing one's unique attributes (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991). Achieving the cultural ideal of independence requires construing 
oneself as an individual whose behavior is made meaningful by reference to one's own 
internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions, rather than by reference to the 
thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. When thinking about themselves, individuals 
with a highly developed independent view of the self will have as a referent their own 
abilities, attributes, characteristics, or goals versus the needs or desire of others. When 
thinking about others, they will consider the other's personal characteristics and attributes 
versus relational or contextual factors (Singelis, 1994). Moreover, individuals with 
independent self-construals living in an individualistic culture are likely to assume others 
strive for the same cultural ideal of independence and will deal with others accordingly. 
Interdependent self-construal. Individuals reared in a culture with core 
interdependent ideals will come to believe and experience themselves as an integral part 
of a context or situation in which the self is connected, fitted, and assimilated with others 
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and the context (Markus & Kitayama 1991). The interdependent construal presumes the 
fundamental connectedness of human beings to each other. Interdependence entails 
seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing that one's 
behavior is contingent on and to a large extent organized by what the actor perceives to 
be the thoughts, feelings, needs, and actions of others in the relationship. This view of 
the self as interdependent features the individual as less differentiated from others 
People are motivated to fit in with others, fulfill and create obligations, and become a part 
of various interpersonal relationships. Although these relationships are critical, the 
interdependent self cannot be properly characterized as a bounded whole, because the 
structure of the social context changes. As each social context changes, the self can 
blend into the environment. The uniqueness of such a self comes from the specific nature 
of the relationships each person has developed. What is critical and objectified in an 
interdependent self is not the inner self or internal attributes (e.g. abilities, opinions, 
judgments, and personality characteristics), but the relationships of the person with other 
actors (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), specific to situations the individual is in Internal 
attributes of the person are considered to be elusive and unreliable in every context or 
situation. Markus and Kitayama, (1991) stated: 
In many domains of social life, one's opinions, abilities, and characteristics are 
assigned secondary roles—they must instead be constantly controlled and 
regulated to come to terms with the primary task of interdependence. Such 
voluntary control of the inner attributes constitutes the core of the cultural ideal of 
becoming mature. (p. 227) 
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According to these authors, the internal needs and desires of the individual are 
placed secondary to the needs of the collective, and maturity is how well the individual 
adapts and blends into the social environment. In order for individuals to successfully 
achieve this ideal sense of the interdependent self, they must be attentive to the collective 
goals and collective mind (Tollesefen, 2002) and have a better sense of collective agency 
(Bandura, 2001). 
The idea of collective agency and conforming to the demands of the collective 
agency is considered absurd and mystical to some, as Tollesefen (2002) mentioned. In 
Western cultures such as the United States, the sense of self being interdependent with 
others often carries negative connotations such as enmeshment, dependent, and having 
weak ego strength (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Markus and Kitayama (1991), however, 
stated that, although the individual is considered to be a part of the context and less 
differentiated from others, the interdependent view of the self does not result in a 
merging of self and other. Nor does it imply that one must always be in the company of 
others to function effectively. It also does not imply that people do not have a sense of 
themselves as agents who are the origins of their own actions, or that agents do not have a 
sense of personal control. Markus and Kitayama (1991) contended: 
It takes a higher degree of self-control and agency to effectively adjust oneself to 
various interpersonal contingencies. Agentic exercise of control, however, is 
directed primarily to the inside and to those inner attributes, such as desires, 
personal goals, and private emotions that can disturb the harmonious equilibrium 
of interpersonal transaction. This can be contrasted with the Western notion of 
control, which primarily implies an assertion of the inner attributes and a 
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consequent attempt to change the outer aspects, such as one's public behaviors 
and the social situations. (p. 228) 
Thus, according to Markus and Kitayama (1991), the personal sense of self is not 
entirely meshed into the demands of the group. They stated that being able to adapt to 
various social situations not only requires a higher sense of personal agency, the direction 
personal agency takes is controlling the self desires, goals and intentions, not controlling 
the environment to fulfill personal desires, goals, and intentions. According to Markus 
and Kitayama (1991), relationships for interdependent individuals are an end in and of 
itself, versus a means to an end. Maintaining a connection with others means being 
constantly aware of others' needs, desires, goals, and intentions. The basic assumption 
among interdependent individuals is that, while promoting the goals of others, the person 
with whom one is interdependent attends to the person's own goals. 
It is important to remember that interdependent individuals only exercise these 
cooperative actions when there is a reasonable assurance of the "good intentions" of 
others, namely that the other also shares a commitment to engage in a reciprocal 
interaction and mutual support (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These "good intentions" of 
the other may not be readily recognized when the other behaves out of context, creates 
tension, and disrupts the social situation by creating a conflict situation. For example, 
imagine an interpersonal conflict situation in which an interdependent individual is 
affronted. Generally, the interdependent person is more sensitive and knowledgeable 
about the context and the needs of the other and therefore is careful not to offend others. 
When affronted, however, the offensive behavior of the other creates tension, and 
disrupts the social harmony. The good intentions of the other become questionable 
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because the negative behavior is out of context and violates prior expectations of the 
other person. As Jones and Davis (1965) suggested, negative actions of others highlight 
the dispositions of the actor. Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggest that for interdependent 
individuals, it is not only the dispositions that are salient; also the underlying intentions 
of the actor become more salient. This may be because the interdependent individual 
may be more sensitive to the need and desire that underlie the offensive behavior. 
To summarize, Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) research identifies two 
different kinds of selves. Essentially, cultural values of individualism and collectivism 
affect perceptions of the self In particular, the collectivist value orientation promotes the 
self-construal of interdependence with others and has a stronger adherence to the sense of 
collective agency. If two kinds of selves exist (independent and interdependent), how 
might the concept of intentionality be affected? More importantly, because the current 
study is concerned about the perception of intentionality in others' behaviors, how does 
the independent and interdependent construal of the self influence the perception of 
intentionality? 
So far the current review has postulated that the perception of intentionality is 
directly influenced by culture (i.e. cultural value orientation of individualism and 
collectivism). Culture also directly influences the perceptions of self. Moreover, the 
construals of the self have been shown to play an intermediary role between cultural 
constructs of individualism and various other psychological processes (Gudykunst et al., 
1996). The direct relationship from self to perceptions of intentionality has not been 
clear-cut. To achieve the aim of the current research of understanding the relations 
among cultural value orientation, construal of the self, and perceptions of intentionality, 
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the next section will briefly discuss the relations between self and perception of 
intentionality. 
Self and Attribution of Intentionality 
There is minimal research on the direct relations between self and intentionality. 
As previously mentioned, one reason for the lack of research may be that the study of 
intentionality on an intuitive level implies a person, a self, an agency is already involved 
(Malle, 1999). We cannot infer intentionality when there are no persons involved (Jones 
& Davis, 1965). As Jones and Davis (1965) propose, the attribution of intentionality is 
indispensable to dispositional attributions. Other researchers (Brandtstddter & Lerner, 
1999; Mascolo, et al., 1999) believe the study of intentionality and agency is central to 
any coherent conception of the self Mascolo et al. (1999) described intentional agency 
(the person) as guided by a particular vision of the self in order to aspire to an ideal sense 
of self no matter what that self may be. Typically, research on self and intentionality has 
focused on the concepts of self-efficacy and motivation. . These studies on self and 
intentionality tend to focus on the individual but not on interpersonal relationships. In 
addition, the studies on self and intentionality typically assume the self is a bounded 
independent self, capable and in control of his or her own actions. 
The current study, however, recognizes there are two different kinds of ideal 
selves that exist: Independent and interdependent. Thus, a closer look at the relations 
between self and intentionality is required. This current study, however, is not interested 
in understanding how having a sense of interdependence lead to a sense of collective 
efficacy and how the group goes about accomplishing a goal. The purpose of this study 
is to understand how the construal of the self as independent or interdependent shapes the 
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attribution of intentionality of others in a social situation. The author believes that 
because cultural constructs of individualism influences the independent self, collectivism 
influences the interdependent self, and culture also influences perception of 
intentionality; the self must play an intermediary role between these two constructs. 
Summary: Culture, Self and Attribution of Intentionality 
Recently, intentionality has been given a significant amount of attention in social 
cognition research. The perception of intentionality is essential in everyday aspects of 
human society. It not only determines the individual's subsequent feelings of anger and 
responses, but also how individuals make judgments of responsibility in crime and 
punishment (Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Weiner, 1995). Typically, 
the study of intentionality falls under the discipline of social psychology, specifically the 
domain of attribution theory. Attribution theory refers to how individuals find causes to 
events in their environment in order to make sense of their world. The foundational 
works by Heider (1958), Weiner (1995), and Jones and Davis (1965) have led the way in 
understanding how individuals perceive dispositional versus situational and controllable 
versus uncontrollable causes. Research studies in attribution theory have neglected the 
study of the attribution of intentionality. This is partly because over the course of 
Heider's work, attribution of intentionality became confounded with dispositional 
attributions, and the importance of intentionality never gained momentum until recently 
(Malle, 1999). Although Jones and Davis (1965) equated attributions of disposition with 
attributions of intentionality, their correspondent inference theory suggested perceivers 
paid close attention to cues in their sociocultural context in order to infer the mental state 
of the other (i.e.intentions). The cues in the environment to which individuals pay 
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attention are conditioned by the larger, cultural values and practices. Therefore, it is 
important to understand how cultural values might influence the perception of 
intentionality. 
To specify what is meant by the perception of intentionality, the current study 
define the perception of intentionality as the belief that another person's negative social 
behavior is construed as non-accidental and purposeful, regardless of the outcome. This 
conceptualization of intentionality differs markedly from philosophical conceptions in 
that philosophy considers intentionality indispensable to agency and the self. However, 
as recent researchers have indicated (Bandura, 2001; Tollefesen, 2002), the idea of 
agency can no longer be restricted to individual agency or the self Bandura (2001) 
discussed notions of collective agency. Tollefesen (2002) recognized the reality of a 
collective mind (i.e. collective intentions). These ideas on collective agency, and also the 
research by Markus and Kitayama (1991) on the construals of the self, advise the current 
study to understand the self in relation to intentionality, specifically the attributions of 
intentionality. 
The philosophical contributions on individualistic and collectivist mindsets in 
reference to intentionality also guide the current research to look at the cultural constructs 
of individualism and collectivism as examined by Hofstede (1980; 2001) and Triandis 
(1994). These cultural constructs have been found to influence the perceptions of self 
(Gudykunst et al., 1996). 
The value orientations of collectivism include sustaining harmony and conformity 
with the ideals and desires of the group rather than the desires of the individual. This 
focus on others' needs is likely to influence the perception of intentionality differently 
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than a focus on personal intentional needs, desires, and goals. Moreover, the emphasis on 
sustaining harmony renders any kind of conflict as ,socially undesirable, and, therefore, 
the intentions of an instigator become more salient. The current study postulates that 
collectivism will be more associated with the attribution of intentionality than 
individualism. 
The cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism are complex because 
aspects of each cultural value orientation can coexist. Triandis et al., (1993) discussed 
that these value orientations were thought to be internalized within the individual. Hence 
at the individual level, the term that corresponds with the value orientation of 
individualism is the independent self and the value orientation of collectivism 
corresponds with the interdependent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, this 
study will examine how the cultural value orientations of individualism and collectivism 
influence the construals of the self as independent and interdependent. 
Thus, it was argued that cultural value orientation influences the perception of 
intentionality. Cultural value orientation also influences the perception of self Although 
no direct linear relations between self and the perception of intentionality have been 
established in previous studies, this study infers this relation because the self (or agency) 
is so closely associated with intentionality (Bandura, 2001; Brandstater, 1999; 
Brandstater & Lerner, 1999). Recall that research on intentionality and self has been 
concerned with how an individual accomplishes an intentional goal. However, Markus 
and Kitayama (1991) have demonstrated that the perception of self is not just a bounded 
autonomous being. As there are two kinds of selves (independent and interdependent), 
perceptions of personal intentional states and the subsequent actions may be viewed 
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differently. Therefore, it is likely that, if intentionality within the agent is different, how 
the agent construes the intentionality of others might also be affected. As the 
interdependent self tends to be more attuned to the context and sensitive to the needs of 
others, and is a product of the collectivist value orientation; it is also likely this type of 
self may be more related to the attribution of intentionality. 
The current study examines how individualism and collectivism affects the perception 
of intentionality. Additionally, it will also examine how individual level factors such as 
the independent and interdependent self affect the perception of intentionality in a 
conflict situation. 
General Hypothesis 
1. A structural equation model based on the hypothesized and theory-based 
relations among collectivism, individualism, and independent and interdependent 
construals of self as antecedents to the attribution of intentionality will fit the data. 
Specific Hypotheses 
2. The construal of self as independent or interdependent is likely to be influenced 
by scores on collectivism and individualism. Individualism is expected to relate to 
independent construal of self, and collectivism is expected to relate to 
interdependent construal of self. 
3. Variations in the cultural value orientations will be predictive of variations in the 
person's perception of intentionality of the instigation in a conflict situation, 
directly and through influences on construals of the self 
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4. 	The interdependent self is expected to be the best predictor of the perception of 




A total of 225 college students were recruited from two public universities in 
Southern California. The inducement for participation included extra-credit points 
towards a course fulfillment. Participants were 44 male and 181 female. The mean age 
of the sample was 26 (SD= 8.26) with a range of 18-59 years old. The ethnic 
backgrounds of the participants were as follows: 78 Latino-Americans (13 males, 65 
females), 62 Anglo-Americans/Non-Latino (13 males, 49 females), 39 African-American 
(5 males, 34 females), and 34 Asian Americans (10 males, 24 females). 
Measures 
An instrument that included measures of cultural value orientations, construal of 
the self, and the perception of intentionality was administered (see Appendix B-F). The 
questionnaires were divided into five sections, which are described below. 
Individualism and collectivism scale. The Cultural Value Orientation scale developed 
by Triandis, et al. (1993) measured scores on individualism and collectivism (see 
Appendix B). This scale was administered first in order to activate the participant's own 
orientations on the cultural dimensions. This scale consists of 32 original items, and 4 
new items were added based on more salient theoretical descriptions of the values about 
the self, inherent in individualism and collectivism. For the individualist variable, the 
following two items were added, "I value the sense of self as a rugged individual, 
independent from others," and "I have been raised to attend to my own thoughts, 
behaviors and feelings." For the collectivism variable, these items were added, "I value 
the ideal sense of self as one who is harmonious with others," and "I have been raised to 
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pay close attention to others' behaviors, thoughts and feelings." Participants rated on 
all 36 items 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree. The Cronbach's alpha reliability 
coefficient for the 32 items was .81, and .83 with the additional 4 items. The 32-item 
scale was utilized for subsequent analyses because the improvement in alphas was not 
substantial. The subscales for individualism and collectivism constructs were divided 
because individualism and collectivism are not opposite ends of one dimension (Triandis 
et al, 1993). 
There were 16 items that measured collectivism. Collectivism was defined as seeking 
harmony with the group, loyalty to the family, and interdependence with others. Items on 
the collectivism scale included statements such as "It is important for me to maintain 
harmony in my group," "If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my 
means," and "I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group". The 
Cronbach's a for the collectivism scale was .81. 
There were 16 items that measured individualism. Individualism was operationalized 
as how much participants value being a unique individual, felt competition with others, 
and reliance on the self Statements that tap into the individualistic construct include 
items such as "I'd rather depend on myself than others," "When another student does 
better than I do, I get tense and aroused," and "Being a unique individual is important to 
me." Cronbach's a coefficient for the individualism scale was .82. 
Self-construal scale. The Self-Construal Scale (SCS) developed by Singelis (1994) 
was used to identify independent and interdependent selves (see Appendix C). This scale 
consists of 24 items and has been used in numerous studies on self-construal research that 
involve gender, self-esteem among many other domains (Yeh & Arora, 2003; Cross, 
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Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Sato & Cameron, 1999; Kashima, Yamaguchi, Kim, Choi, 
Gelfand, Yuki, 1995). Singelis (1994) found that a Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
comparing a one-factor model versus a two-factor model for independence and 
interdependence showed a better fit for the two-factor model (AGFI= .824, x2 (251)= 
690.93). There were 12 items that measured independence and 12 items that measured 
interdependence. Participants rated all items of the scale from 1= strongly disagree to 7= 
strongly agree. The Cronbach's alpha reliability for the entire scale was .74 for the 
current study. 
The independent self-construal was defined as the belief of the self as bounded, 
unitary, stable and separate from the social context. The independent self-construal also 
included an emphasis on the internal abilities, thoughts, feelings, and expressing the 
unique self and directness of communication. The items on the independent self-
construal included, "Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me," "I am the same 
person at home that I am at school," and "I act the same way no matter whom I am with." 
Higher scores indicated higher levels of the independent self-construal. The Cronbach's 
alpha = .72 for the independent scale. 
The interdependent self-construal was defined by having a sense of self as bounded to 
others, and this self is flexible and attentive to social roles, status, and relationships. 
Interdependent self-construal also was related to how much a person feels intertwined 
with others and considers the self as part of the context rather than separate entities. The 
items on the interdependent scale included, "I will stay in a group if they need me, even 
when I'm not happy with the group," "I respect people who are modest about 
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themselves". The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the interdependent scale (a= .79) was 
much higher than the entire scale 
Description of conflict. Following the SCS, participants were asked to describe a 
conflict scenario they had encountered within the last year with another person (see 
Appendix D). Subsequently, some questions were asked as an attempt to contextualize 
the nature of the conflict. They were instructed to indicate how long ago the conflict 
occurred, whom the conflict involved, where it occurred, and whether if they believed the 
individual they were in conflict with was a close person. Participants were also asked to 
indicate if they felt the conflict was resolved. Additional items asked participants to rate 
the experience of the conflict, how the family they grew up in viewed conflict, and the 
outcome of the conflict on a scale of 1 (Negative)-7 (Positive). 
Attribution of intentionality scale. The Attribution-Emotion Scale (AES), developed 
by Betancourt, Guthrie, Hodges and Batista (2002), was used to assess the participants' 
perception of intentionality and controllability of the action, and related interpersonal 
emotions in response to the conflict situation (see Appendix E). The Attribution-Emotion 
Scale (AES) consisted of 11 items that was comprised of two non-orthogonal factors: 
Intentionality (5 items) and internal controllability of the action (3 items). The 3 items 
remaining assessed for external controllability of the action (i.e. controlled by others), but 
were not used in the primary analyses. Although the perception of internal and external 
controllability is of lesser importance in this study, internal controllability was assessed 
because the attribution of controllability is conceptually related to the attribution of 
intentionality. Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients were .63 for the internal 
controllability factor and .90 for the intentionality factor. 
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Following this portion of the AES, participants were asked to write down what they 
believed to be the cause of the other person's behavior. Based on the cause they wrote, 
they were asked to rate a revised version of the Causal Dimension Scale—II (CDS-II), 
developed by McAuley, Russell, & Duncan, (1992) to assess personal controllability, 
stability, and locus of control of the cause. Although controllability was assessed two 
times, the difference is that the former (internal controllability) corresponds to 
attributions about the action, and the latter (personal controllability) corresponds to 
attributions about the cause of the individual's behavior. Although the perception of 
stability and personal controllability for the cause is of lesser importance, the locus of 
control (i.e. dispositional) is relevant to perceiving intentionality (Jones & Davis, 1965). 
The Cronbach's alpha reliability for locus was a= .78, a= .78 for personal controllability, 
and a= .54 for stability. 
The last part of the AES (16 items) assessed the participant's experience of several 
emotions, such as anger, compassion, and distressed feelings in response to the conflict. 
The Cronbach's alpha for angry feelings was a = .88, a = .88 for compassion, and a = .83 
for distressed emotions (e.g. guilt, shame, embarrassed, depressed, and lonely. 
Demographics. General information about the participants was requested (see 
Appendix F). Information requested were the participants' age, gender, ethnicity, 
religion, citizenship status, and program of study. No identifying information was 
required. 
Procedures 
The researcher first contacted sponsoring faculty from two undergraduate 
institutions to request students as participants for the study. The students were from two 
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local universities (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona and California State 
University, San Bernardino). Data collection procedures were in compliance with each 
university's protocol. 
From California State University, San Bernardino, a flyer posting several dates 
and times for participation in the study was posted on a central bulletin board. There 
were a total of eight days within a span of four weeks for students to participate. 
Students wrote their names on a sheet that was most convenient for them and reported to 
a specified room on the day of their participation. Upon their arrival, they were given a 
cover letter that described the nature of the study and the expectations of them (see 
Appendix A). They were then asked to check the cover letters indicating that they read 
the cover letter and agree to participate. If they chose not to participate, they were 
allowed to leave. All students agreed to participate, and the questionnaire was handed to 
them. They were allotted up to 30 minutes for completing the questionnaire. After they 
finished, they were given an extra credit slip worth 4 units to be used in any class they 
chose. Approximately 200 questionnaires were collected from this school. 
From Cal Poly Pomona, the announcement of the study was posted on a website 
Students signed up on the web for a date that was most convenient for them. At Cal Poly, 
there were only a total of two days possible for participation because the subject pool was 
smaller. Upon students' arrival, the procedures were exactly the same as Cal State San 
Bernardino. However, they were asked to write their names on a note card and slip it into 
a drop box in order for the researcher to know who participated in the study. This was 
necessary because only the researcher had access to the web page to award the extra 
credit points. Approximately 25 questionnaires were collected from this school. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Assumptions. The assumptions of normality, and linearity were examined for all 
relevant variables of the study. All variables (attribution of intentionality, individualism, 
independent and interdependent selves) of the study were found to be within the 
acceptable range of z= ± 1.96, except for collectivism. Collectivism had one extreme 
outlier (z= -7.50) and this initially resulted in a negatively skewed distribution. 
Therefore, this case was deleted in further analyses. Subsequent analyses resulted in 224 
cases to be studied. 
Correlations. A correlation matrix comparing the total scores of individualism, 
collectivism, independent self, interdependent self, the perception of intentionality, and 
all other relevant variables of the study are presented in Table 1 (Table 2 represents 
partial correlations of gender and ethnicity controlled). The additional variables included 
the perception of personal and other's control of the action, causal attribution processes 
(e.g. locus of control, personal controllability, other controllability, and stability), 
perceived experience of the conflict as positive or negative, and related interpersonal 
emotions (e.g. anger, compassion, distressed feelings). Although the additional variables 
were not central to the hypotheses of this study, they were included in the correlations to 
examine the general relations among all theoretically relevant variables to the attribution 
of intentionality. As can be seen, there are numerous significant correlations. 
A positive relation was found between individualism and collectivism value 
orientations. Individualism was positively related to the independent self-construal, 
attribution of controllability of the action, and internal locus. Collectivism was positively 
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related to the interdependent self-construal, as well as the independent self-construal. The 
independent self-construal positively related with the perception of controllability of the 
action. According to this matrix, the variables related to the attribution of intentionality 
were the perception of personal controllability of the action, and dispositional causal 
attributions. The perception of intentionality was not related to cultural value orientations 
of individualism, collectivism, or the independent and interdependent construal of the 
self. 
Table 1 
Correlation matrix of all relevant variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
13 
1 Individualism 
2 Collectivism .20** 
3 Intentionality .10 .06 N= 224 
4 Action P. Control .19** .04 .25** 
5 Action 0. Control .11 .09 .03 .06 
6 Angry Feelings .16* .13 .16* .22** .13* _ 
7 Compassion -.07 .13* -.16* -.20** .07 -.18** 
8 Distressed Feel -.02 .17* -.00 -.02 .13 .35** .20** 
9 Independent .38** .15* .11 .18* -.01 -.08 .09 -.16* "08 10 Interdependent .04 .72** .05 .05 .10 .13 .20** .21* 
11 Dispositional .17* .12 .20** .15* -.05 .08 02 -.04 .25"* 
03 
12 Personal Control .07 .11 .05 .45** .06 .06 -.13 -.08 12 
06 .35** 
13 Others Control .14* .02 -.05 .04 .55** .03 .11 -.03 
.04 05 .04 .22* 
02 -.08 
14 Stability .01 -.11 .17* .02 -.04 .05 -.04 -.04 
-.06 -.07 .22** 
-.12 -.05 
15 View .03 -.19** -.32** -.08 -.09 -.27** .16* -.17** 
.08 -.08 -.04 
o 	Correlation between Stability and View, r=-.13* 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 2 
Partial Correlations of Main Variables Controlled for the Effects of Gender and 
Ethnicity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Individualism 
2 Collectivism .21** 
3 Intentionality .08 .08 
4 Action P. Control .20** .05 .26** 
5 Independent .38** .18** .10 .18** 
6 Interdependent .03 .72** .04 .06 .09 
7 Dispositional .17* .11 .20** .16* .26** .03 
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ANOV.As. Factorial ANOVA was used to test for potential effects of gender and 
ethnicity on the model variables of individualism, collectivism, independent self, 
interdependent self, and intentionality (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). 
Graphs 1-5 represent the estimated marginal mean scores and possible interaction effects 
of gender and ethnicity on individualism collectivism, independent, interdependence, and 
perception of intentionality. The graphs indicate that interactions between gender and 
ethnicity on the variables were not significant. For individualism, the omnibus test 
showed a main effect of gender, F (1, 224)= 4.53,p= .03, with males (M = 79.18, SD--
13.52) being more individualistic than females (A/ = 74.97, SD = 11.19). For 
independent self, the omnibus test revealed a main effect for ethnicity F (4, 224)= 5.14, 
p= .00. Post hoc analysis using the LSD procedures revealed that African Americans 
(M= 68.64, SD= 8.66) were higher than Asian Americans (M= 58. 52 SD— 10.48), 
(p—
.00) on the independent self-construal. Although ANOVA results suggested gender and 
ethnicity may be potential covariates of the dependent variables, subsequent analyses 
presented did not control for them'. 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) for Main Variables of the study 
Ethnicity 
Individualism  Collectivism Independent Interdependent Intentionality 
M 	SD M 	SD M 	SD M 	SD M SD 
Anglo- 76.11 12.06 79.56 9.71 64.82 9.32 59.89 8.93 20.45 8.95 
American 
African- 76.92 11.21 80.90 11.24 68.64 8.66 59.23 12.33 21.31 9.21 
American 
Asian- 76.00 3.08 87.27 8.63 58.52 10.48 66.64 9.55 17.61 8.10 
American 
Latino- 74.45 11.50 83.72 10.52 62.82 10.07 61.92 9.77 18.33 9.04 
American 
Sex 
Male 79.18 13.52 82.85 9.11 63.72 11.01 63.00 9.70 22.74 9.04 
Female 74.97 11.19 82.56 10.95 64.02 9.85 61.06 10.65 18.63 8.81 
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Graph 1. Individualism Value Orientation by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant 
Note: Interaction is not significant, F (4, 224)= 1.16, p= .33 
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Graph 2. Collectivism Value Orientation by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant 
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Graph 3. Independent Self-Construal by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant 
Note: Interaction is not significant, F (4, 224)= 1.47,p= .21. 
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Graph 4. Interdependent Self-Construal by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant 
Note: Interaction is not significant, F (4, 224)= 1.09,p= .36. 
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Graph 5. The Perception of Intentionality by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant 










Test of Hypotheses 
Bentler's (1995) EQS program for structural equation modeling was used to 
analyze the structure of relations among the variables proposed to influence intentionality 
as well as specific hypotheses of the study. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a 
statistical methodology that takes a hypothesis-testing approach to the multivariate 
analysis of a structural theory from a set of sample data (Byrne, 1994). Structural 
equation modeling allows for the incorporation of factor structure while testing 
simultaneous paths, and also accounting for measurement error. Typically a model is 
proposed by the researcher grounded in theory, past empirical research in the area of 
study, or both. Once a model has been specified (see Figure 2 for example), the 
plausibility of this model is tested based on sample data that comprise all the observed 





Figure 2. Measurement Model For Testing General Hypothesis 
The primary task of model testing is to determine the goodness of fit between the 
covariance matrixes from an approximation of population values to the covariance matrix 
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from the observed data. There are several fit indices to indicate the goodness of fit, 
however, typically the more popular and common one used is the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI). In general, the structure of the theoretical model is compared to a model of no 
relations among the variables. The degree to which these two models differ yields a 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI). This fit index range from 0 to 1 with higher scores 
indicating a better fit of the specified model over the null model (Byrne, 1994). CFI 
values greater than .90 are indicative of adequate fitting models whereas values of .95 are 
indicative of a good fitting model (Bentler, 1995). Also a Chi-square test was used to 
determine the degree to which the estimated covariance matrix matches the data 
covariance matrix. In general, a x2  significance test greater than .05 is indicative of a 
good/close-fitting model. However, given that the null hypothesis of a perfect fit is an 
unrealistic standard (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999), nonsignificant )(2 
results are not expected. One standard proposed for a good fit is x2 /df values less than 3 
(Kline, 1998). The Root Mean Square Error Analysis (RMSEA) is another indicator of a 
close fit between the model and the data. By convention, RMSEA values of less than .05 
indicates a close fit, values between .05 and .08 indicate an acceptable fit, and values 
between .08 and .10 indicate marginal fit (Fabrigar, et al., 1999). EQS generally regards 
all variables as falling into either measured (observed, manifest) variables, which is 
represented by squares, and unmeasured (latent, factors) variables, which is represented 
by circles. 
Measurement Model 
There were several ways in which the hypothesized model could have been tested. 
For the purposes of this study, the manifest variable model of cultural value orientations, 
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the construal of the self, and a latent factor of the attribution of intentionality was 
preferred. This model was preferred because there is much debate in the literature on the 
sub dimensions of collectivism, and individualism (Oyserman, et. al., 2002). These 
debates complicate the development of appropriate indicators of each latent factor of 
cultural value orientations. As the purpose of the current study was not to resolve the 
debates related to measures of collectivism and individualism, but rather how the general 
concepts of these constructs influence attribution processes, the cultural variables were 
represented by two manifest variables. Representing the self-construal by latent factors 
was also not preferred because there have not been enough literature to support dividing 
these constructs into subcomponents (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004). The 
measurement model is depicted in Figure 2. This model represents all proposed relations 
among cultural value orientations, construal of the self and the perception of 
intentionality. This model consists of one latent factor, and nine manifest variables. 
The first manifest variable represents the total mean score of individualism that 
derived from 16-item subscale of the Collectivism and Individualism (CI) Scale (Triandis 
et al, 1986). The second manifest variable represents collectivism, which is the mean 
score of the 16-item subscale from the CI Scale. 
The observed variables of independent and interdependent self-construal were 
developed from the Self Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994). The independent variable 
represents the averaged score of all the independent items derived from the Independent 
sub-scale. The interdependent variable is developed from the averaged score of all 
interdependent items from the Interdependent sub-scale. The latent variable, the 
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attribution of intentionality is composed of five original items that derived from the 
revised Attribution-Emotion Scale developed by Betancourt, et al., (2002). 
According to Figure 2, it was expected that the path from individualism to the 
independent self-construal will be positive and significant, and the path from collectivism 
to the interdependent self will be the same. Individualism and collectivism is expected to 
covary partly because the participants recruited for the study (undergraduates in the 
United States) are likely to hold both value orientations. This model also shows that the 
path from collectivism to the perception of intentionality is expected to be positive, and 
the path from the interdependent self-constnial to intentionality is expected to be positive. 
The path from independent self to intentionality is also expected to be positive. 
Model Estimation: The first test of the model representing the proposed set of 
relations among cultural value orientation, the construal of the self as determinants of the 
inference of intentionality fit the data well. The independence model that tests the 
hypothesis that the variables are uncorrelated with one another was easily rejected, x2 (36, 
N= 224) = 945.86, p< .00. The chi-square test for the fit between the independence 
model and the hypothesized model was x2 (25, N= 224)= 78.82, p< .00, (x2 /df = 3.15). 
The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .94, Root Mean Square Error Analysis (RMSEA) = 





















Figure 3. Results of Hypothesized Model with standardized solutions. X2 (25, 224)= 
78.82, p= .00, CFI= .94, RMSEA= .10. 
Model Modifications. Post hoc model modifications were performed in an attempt 
to obtain a better fitting model. The modifications were made based on conceptually 
acceptable relations derived from the Lagrange Multiplier Tests for adding parameters. A 
path from individualism to the interdependent construal of the self was added. The 
addition of this path improved the Chi square test, x2 (24, 224)= 74.13, p< .00, (x2 /df= 
















Figure 4. Results of Modified Hypothesized Model with standardized solutions. x2 (24, 
224)= 74.13, p= .00, CFI= .95, RMSEA= .10. 
Specific Hypotheses. Based on the test of the modified model, the general 
hypothesis was confirmed. As can be observed in Figure 4, the specific hypothesis that 
the construal of the self is likely to be influenced by cultural value orientation was 
strongly supported. Individualism influenced the independent construal of self 
(standardized solution = .38, p < .00), and collectivism influenced the interdependent 
self-construal (standardized solution = .74, p< .00). The specific hypothesis that cultural 
value orientation (i.e. collectivism) would directly and indirectly through the construal of 
the self influence the perception of intentionality was not supported. 
Additional Analyses 
The purpose of this study was to understand the attribution of intentionality in 
relation to culture and the construal of the self, within the context of a structural equation 
model. Thus far, results have demonstrated that cultural value orientations and the 
construal of the self do not have a direct or indirect influence on the attribution of 
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intentionality. However, other variables relevant to studying attribution of intentionality 
have not been included in the tests of the models. To fully comprehend the phenomena 
of intentionality, a broader model examining other relevant variables, within the context 
of culture, self, and the perception of intentionality was essential to exam. In particular, 
two variables of interest were the causal attributions of locus of control (dispositional 
versus situational), and the perception of personal controllability. 
Locus and Controllability. Personal controllability is a relevant factor because 
Weiner (1986; 1995) theorized that it is almost impossible to attribute intentionality in 
others' behaviors without perceiving controllability of the cause. Recall Weiner believed 
that the attribution of intent is usually last in a chain of causal attribution processes 
including perceiving internal locus, controllability, and then judgment of responsibility. 
Jones and Davis (1965), however, believed that "intentions paved the rocky road from 
acts to dispositions" (Rosati, et al, 2001, p.302). This meant perceiving intent in others 
was a key step in attributing a positive or negative disposition (i.e. internal attributions). 
Moreover, dispositional attributions have been studied in relation to cultural value 
orientations (Knowles, et. al., 2001). 
A broader, general model (see Figure 5) incorporating these two additional factors 
of controllability and internal locus within the context of the hypothesized model was 
tested. This model shows culture variables remained the same as two measured variables 
(obtained by the total mean scores of the individualism subscale and the collectivism 
subscale). The construal of the self remained the same as two manifest variables from the 



























Figure 5. Measurement Model Incorporating Locus and Controllability. 
controllability, and intentionality). The internal locus construct composed of two 
indicators (obtained from two individual items from AES), and controllability consisted 
of three indicators (three individual items from the AES), and intentionality remained the 
same with five indicators. The paths from the cultural orientations to self-construal were 
the same. The paths from collectivism to intentionality and from the construals of the 
self to intentionality were retained in the test of the model. Additionally, the four 
measured variables of cultural value orientation and self-construals also predicted the two 
new constructs of locus and controllability. The path from cultural value orientations to 
the locus of control was added because previous literature by Knowles, et al., (1999) 
demonstrated that a cultural value orientation influences dispositional attributions (i.e. 
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internal locus of control). The path from cultural value orientations to internal 
controllability was added because a study by Zaw (2002) demonstrated that 
controllability is a function of value orientations. The self-construal variables were 
expected to relate to these variables because the self-construal may mediate these 
relations. 
The broad hypothesis that locus and controllability would mediate the relations 
between culture, self, and intentionality was confirmed. The first run of the model 
showed that the independence model testing the hypothesis that the variables are 
uncorrelated with one another was easily rejected, x2 (91, 224)= 1234.83, p< .00. The 
Chi-square test for the fit between the independence model and the hypothesized model 
was x2 (64, N= 224)= 127.21, p< .00, (x2 /df = 1.98). The Comparative Fit Index showed 
a good fit (CFI = .94, RMSEA = .07). 
Post hoc modifications were performed according to the Wald Test for dropping 
parameters and the Lagrange for adding parameters. The results of these modifications 
can be observed in Figure 6. Based on the Wald Test, and for the sake of a parsimonious 
model, several paths were dropped. All paths from culture and self-construal variables to 
intentionality were dropped. The path from individualism to internal locus of control was 
also dropped. Based on Lagrange, one path from individualism to interdependence was 
added. The results of these modifications revealed a better fit of the data, x2 (69, N-











Figure 6. Model Incorporating Locus and Controllability with standardized solutions. )(2  
(69, 224)= 125.03, p= .00, CFI= .95, RMSEA= .06 
The model in Figure 6 shows that although cultural value orientation and the 
construal of the self may not have a direct and indirect effect on the perception of 
intentionality, the cultural value orientation and the construal of the self affects the 
cognitive/attribution processes that in turn affect the perception of intentionality. The 
path from internal locus to intentionality was positive (standardized solution= .18, p< 
.02), and the path from controllability to intentionality was also positive (standardized 
solution= .33, p < .00). In addition, the path from individualism to controllability was 
positive (standardized solution— .21, p< .01). The relations between cultural value 
orientations and the construal of selves remained significant. 
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While the current study sought to understand the attribution of intentionality in 
relation to culture and the construal of self, within the context of a conflict situation, this 
study did not test how all other variables examined in this study (e.g. view of the conflict, 
interpersonal emotions, outcome of the conflict) might influence the attribution of intent. 
Moreover, the specific types of conflict, the nature of the conflict, and with whom the 
conflict experience involved (i.e. spouse, siblings, friends, boyfriends/girlfriends, 
roommates, colleagues, professors, coworkers, supervisors, or strangers) was not 
delineated. The over-arching general model incorporating these other variables within a 
specific conflict scenario is beyond the main interests of the current study that sought to 
understand the general model of attribution of intentionality in terms of cultural value 
orientation and the construal of the self. 
Discussion 
Summary and Interpretations of Results 
The current study examined predictors for the attribution of intentionality. 
Whereas several variables can be considered, this study proposed a model of how cultural 
value orientation and the construal of the self predict the perception of intent. Initial 
results revealed that the data fit the model well, and cultural value orientation influenced 
the construal of the self However, the specific hypotheses that cultural value orientation 
directly and indirectly through the construal of the self would predict the attribution of 
intentionality was not supported. Although cultural value orientation and the self served 
as weak predictors of the attribution of intentionality, additional analyses revealed several 
interesting findings. These analyses showed cultural value orientation and the construal 
of the self indirectly predict the attribution of intentionality through cognitive/attribution 
processes such as controllability and locus of control. The implications of these findings 
are manifold. 
One implication of the findings supports Jones and Davis's (1965) 
conceptualization of the role of the socio-cultural context in perceiving intentionality and 
dispositional attributions. Whereas Weiner's theory ignored the influence of socio-
cultural factors in attribution processes, the current study supported Jones and Davis' 
conceptualization that individuals attend to the social context to form opinions and 
judgments of others' behaviors. Specifically, the results revealed that cultural value 
orientation of individualism influenced the independent self-construal, which influenced 
dispositional attributions, and in turn influenced the perception of intentionality. In other 
words, being socialized to uphold individualist values influences the belief about the self 
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as independent from others, which affects the belief that others' behaviors are caused by 
dispositional factors, as well as an underlying mental state (i.e. intentionality). Although 
Jones and Davis believed perceptions of intentionality preceded dispositional attributions, 
this study showed that culture and its related variables (e.g. the self) are a function of 
dispositional attributions, which in turn affect the perception of intentionality. This 
relation between cultural variables and dispositional attributions also support past studies 
by Knowles et al., (2001), Menon et al., (2001), in that value orientation of independence 
influences one's belief about dispositional causes to behaviors (i.e., personality traits). 
The current study further implies that perceiving dispositional causes to others' behaviors 
leads to perceiving an underlying intent of others' behaviors. 
Although the current study showed dispositional attributions lead to intentional 
attributions, these findings somewhat challenges Weiner's (1986) view that the 
perception of controllability immediately follows dispositional attributions. In Weiner's 
view, when an event occurs and dispositional causes are perceived, individuals assess for 
controllability of the action, which leads to judgment of responsibility. Attributions of 
intentionality are assessed only after judgments of responsibility have been made. The 
results in this study, however, suggest that perceptions of intentionality may precede 
judgment of responsibility because the results showed that perception of intentionality is 
a direct function of controllability. Although judgment of responsibility was not assessed 
in the current study, this study showed perceiving controllability of the action strongly 
predicted perceiving intentionality. The exact order in which locus, controllability, 
responsibility, and intentionality operate is not yet clear from the results, as the purpose 
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was not to confirm a model for the linear order of these relations. Future studies may 
examine the order of the attribution process in relation to cultural value orientations. 
The purpose of this study, however, was to understand the attribution of 
intentionality as a dependent variable within the context of cultural value orientation and 
its related variables. As such, the results showed that the individualist value orientation 
directly predicted controllability, which, in turn influenced the attribution of 
intentionality. The implication of this finding is that broader cultural ideals may 
influence judgment of controllability because various cultures may shape individuals in 
how the sense of control, and the source of control, is viewed. In fact, there are cultural 
value orientations that correspond with the sense of control over one's life, which past 
researches have termed fatalism and mastery (Betancourt & Fuentes, 2001; Betancourt, 
Hardin, & Manzi, 1996; McMillin, 2002). For example, in the case of health and illness, 
the cultural value orientations of mastery alludes to the sense of personal control over 
one's health, whereas fatalistic values defer control to an external power, such as God or 
nature (see McMillin, 2002; Flynn, 2003). The results of the current study further imply 
that having an individualist orientation and a sense of personal power over ones life, 
affect the perception of controllability in others' behaviors as well. Moreover, perceiving 
controllability in others' behaviors also influences the perception of an underlying mental 
state causing a behavior. Although Weiner's theory was supported in demonstrating that 
the attribution of intentionality is subsequent to the attribution of intentionality, the 
findings in this study suggest that attribution processes are not decontextualized from the 
socio-cultural context that shape value orientation, and in turn influence attribution 
processes. 
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In general, one of the most important implications of the current study is that, 
when thinking about others' behaviors, the cultural values to which the perceiver is 
oriented play a significant role in how judgments and opinions are formed about the 
behavior. That is, attribution processes are embedded in a particular cultural context, 
which individuals internalize as their cultural value orientation. As this study showed, 
the internalized cultural value orientation influences individuals' cognitive processes (i.e. 
attribution processes), particularly for the individualists. Although the current study was 
specifically interested in how the collectivist value orientation influences attribution 
processes, the results did not necessarily show support for these hypotheses. The details 
for not finding these results will be addressed in the limitations section. One particular 
reason may be due to the complexity of the collectivist value orientation (e.g. in-group 
out-group distinctions) and the embeddedness of the participants in an individualist 
culture. As such, there are several practical implications of the results within an 
individualist culture. These results may especially be relevant for practicing clinicians in 
how the individualist culture in which they practice can shape their own attribution 
processes in dealing with clients with various cultural value orientations. 
Clinical Applications. In the United States, clinical psychologists in training are 
often indirectly socialized to master the individualist value orientation. This is partly 
because the roots of Western Psychology stem from Western European values that 
include individualist ideals. As the mainstream dominant cultural value in the United 
States continues to be individualism (i.e. the idea that individuals are unique, and 
independent from others, and in control of ones own destiny), clinicians may find it 
beneficial to transmit the cultural value of individualism to help clients adjust in the 
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mainstream culture. Whether or not clinicians have personal preferences for collectivist 
or individualist value orientation is not the main issue. Clinicians are still trained to work 
within individualistic context and transmit individualist values within the therapeutic 
relationship. 
If clinicians are trained to work around individualist values, they must also 
perceive more controllability of their clients' behaviors. As this study suggest, 
individualism has direct effects on the attribution of controllability. The theoretical 
importance of this is that if controllability is perceived, it is more likely that intentionality 
may also be perceived. One implication of perceiving intentionality (i.e., the underlying 
mental causes in another person's behavior) is that it can lead to positive or negative 
outcomes. 
The positive aspect of perceiving intentionality in clients' behaviors could be that 
the clinician can distinguish clients' actions as caused by static dispositions versus fluid 
intentions. If clinicians can see that behaviors are caused by the intentions that results 
from a perception of control, they may be more optimistic about change by helping 
clients become more aware of the underlying mental process that drives their particular 
behaviors. If, however, clients' behaviors are attributed to static dispositional traits, the 
motivation to see change in the client may not be as likely. Attributing behavior to 
dispositional traits tends to be superficial and falls short of fully understanding the mental 
process motivating a behavior. This mental process (intentions) could be situational in 
that intentional states flow with changes in situations (Rosati, et al., 2001). If clinicians 
are able to appreciate the fluidity of mental states, they may be more helpful by bringing 
attention to the mental process, rather than calling attention to a personality trait. 
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The potentially negative aspect of assuming intentionality in clients' behaviors is 
that one cannot usually perceive intent without judgment. Typically, judgment of another 
is followed by delivery of social consequences toward that other. If clinicians are not 
careful in suspending the judgment that follows intent, it can influence how they behave 
toward the client, which can result in serious negative outcomes. Clinicians do not bear 
responsibility to deliver rewards or punishment for clients' behaviors. Rather, they share 
some responsibility in helping clients to adjust and adapt to the dominant cultural values 
Particularly, for the clinicians practicing in the U.S., part of that responsibility involves 
socializing and transmitting individualist value orientations. At the same time, clinicians 
are expected to appreciate that clients' behaviors are a function of situationally caused 
fluid mental states. 
In this respect, it appears that the art of being a clinician may involve being able 
to appreciate others' situational factors (which tends to be collectivistic), while helping 
others to develop a stronger sense of self and identity (which tends to be individualistic). 
This may be particularly helpful in a Western individualist culture like the U.S. This does 
not, however, yield information on how practicing clinicians may operate in collectivist 
cultures. Future studies should examine how practicing clinicians in Eastern collectivist 
cultures deal with clients from various cultures. Would practicing clinicians in Eastern 
collectivist cultures transmit collectivist values by helping clients to become more aware 
of their situations? Would they foster individual identity development? 
Limitations 
Although the results in this study have several implications, some limitations of 
the study must be addressed. One limitation of this study was the lack of support for the 
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hypothesized relation between the collectivist value orientation and the attribution 
processes (e.g., intentionality). A reason for this finding may be that collectivism may 
influence attribution processes, depending on who judgments are to be made about. There 
may be a distinction in how collectivists attribute intent toward members of in-groups 
versus how they infer intent in members of out-groups. As past research by Pearson and 
Stephan (1998) has demonstrated, collectivists generally respond to in-group and out- 
group members differently. 
Although in-group and out-group distinction was assessed, (by assessing 
perceived closeness of the other) the current study did not include this variable in tests of 
the models. One reason for this neglect was that participants in the current study did not 
express a strict collectivist view of in-groups. That is, perceiving closeness with others 
does not equate to traditional collectivist consideration of in-groups. The traditional 
collectivist view of in-groups is that individuals are bound together by kinship, ethnicity, 
tribe, or nation. Participants' view of in-groups for this study reflected the individualist 
view of in-groups, in that they perceived individuals from other ethnicity or nationality as 
in-groups. The individualist view of in-groups is that boundaries are loose, bound 
together by shifting beliefs and ideologies. As traditional studies on in-group and out-
group distinctions are most apparent from the collectivist view of in-groups (Hofstede, 
2002), the current study did not provide sufficient theoretical support for measures of in-
groups and out-groups. Future studies may need to manipulate the in-group and out-
group distinction in order to understand how this distinction moderates the relation 
between value orientations of collectivism and attribution processes. 
71 
An additional limitation was that the construal of the conflict situation as negative 
or positive was-not taken into consideration in the model. As the collectivism value 
orientation is associated with social norms that require group harmony, people high on 
collectivism may be more likely to view conflict as more negative and view the actions of 
the other more negatively. As previous-researchers have noted, the negative actions of 
others calls attention to the person's intentions that lead to the perception of dispositional 
attributions (see Jones & Davis, 1965). The negative construal of conflict may have 
mediated the relations between cultural value orientation and the perception of 
intentionality. This variable was not tested in the model. If it had been included, it may 
be likely that collectivism would also indirectly and positively relate to the attribution of 
intentionality through the view of the conflict as a negative experience. Future studies 
may need to control for the view of conflict as mediating cultural value orientation and 
attribution processes. 
Another limitation also pertaining to the conflict experiences was that this study 
did not delineate the specific types of conflict the participants encountered. Even though 
participants were requested to specify an interpersonal conflict with only one other 
individual, the severity and the outcomes of the conflict varied. As participants were 
asked to recall and write down their own subjective conflict situation, it is difficult to tell 
how specific conflict situations would have altered the general model. Therefore, the 
generalizability of the findings to all-types and severity of conflict situations and 
outcomes is limited. Future studies in this area may find a way to focus on one particular 
type of conflict. 
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The general limitations of this study concern generalizability and the 
methodology. The generalizability is limited to undergraduate college students in 
Southern California. In addition, the over representations of females in the study also 
suggest that these results may not generalize evenly to males as much for females. The 
methodology in =Tent research may be also improved in measuring.cultural value 
orientation, the construal of the self, as well as the inferences of intentionality. 
Researchers in the past have noted that identifying cultural value orientation may not 
always be a declarative process that individuals could easily access in paper and pencil 
form (Oyserman, et al., 2002). This notion may also apply to measures of the self as well 
as the measures of attribution of intentionality. Additionally, even though the self-
construal variables and the cultural value orientation variables are distinct constructs, this 
study used very similar methodological instruments to measure these variables. Future 
research in culture and the self may consider using different instruments and methods to 
identify each construct. 
Future Directions 
The purpose of this study was to understand the attribution of intentionality in 
relation to cultural value orientation and the construal of the self. In order to accomplish 
this goal, this phenomenon was investigated within the context of a conflict situation with 
undergraduate university students. As such, there were several limitations. To attenuate 
the limitations, future,studies should first address the general limitations regarding the 
participants and the methodological issues of measurement of cultural value orientation 
and construal of the self. One way this could be accomplished is to consider measuring 
only the sub-dimensions of cultural value orientations to explain a particular 
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phenomenon. For example, individualism is comprised of three main sub dimensions, 
which include unique individuality, competitiveness with others, and reliance on the self 
Collectivism is comprised of three main sub dimensions of harmony with the group, 
loyalty to family, and interdependence with others. As indicated previously, there are 
debates on the literature in how individualism and collectivism should be measured 
(Oyserman, et. al., 2002). Future studies may consider taking additional steps to refine 
these constructs, rather than using the general concepts of individualism and collectivism. 
Future research in this area of culture, attribution process and conflict may also 
delineate the specific conditions under which the results of this study holds best in several 
social situations. For example, the assumption behind using a conflict scenario to study 
cultural differences in intentionality was that conflict generally highlights the dispositions 
of others. As shown in this study, dispositional attributions influence the perception of 
intentionality of others in the conflict situation. It seems that the negative behaviors of 
others are salient in determining intentions that drive behavior. But how are intentions of 
others perceived when the behavior of the other is positive and pro-social? Would 
intentionality be perceived in those instances? Would there be cultural variations in 
attribution processes for altruism? 
If research on intentionality and culture is within the context of conflict, another 
avenue future research may take is to specify the types of conflict situation. That is, 
conflict between families, between neighbors, between superiors and students/workers 
should be well defined. Moreover, this general model of cultural value orientation and 
attribution processes may be tested in live conflict settings that occur in organizations, 
legal settings, and even community conflict resolution centers. Most importantly, future 
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research should take into consideration the in-group/out-group status of the opponent, and 
manipulate the distinction. This may answer the question: Do collectivists perceive more 
intentionality for out-group versus in-group members? 
As generalizability was limited for these results, another way intentionality and 
culture may be studied is to recruit participants from various populations (e.g., outside of 
the United States). Such populations may include non-students in work settings, or 
students embedded in traditionally collectivist cultures. It might also be interesting to 
extend this model to comparisons between clinical populations versus non-clinical 
populations. Are there differences in perceptions of intentionality in clinical and non. 
clinical populations? 
In the current study, the attribution of intentionality was the dependent variable of 
interest, and authors were interested in predictors of the attribution of intentionality 
versus the outcomes of perceiving intentionality. Future directions in studying 
intentionality may observe this variable as either an independent variable or mediating 
another phenomena. Although this study observed interpersonal emotions, it did not 
analyze how the perception of intent would influence feelings of anger, sympathy and 
compassion, or other distressed emotions (Betancourt & Blair, 1992). Future research 
may also include specific conflict resolution preferences and outcomes of the conflict that 
may be influenced by the attribution of intentionality. 
In sum, an all-encompassing model that incorporates the cultural value 
orientation, the construal of the self, views about the conflict, the causal attribution 
processes as predictors of intentionality in specific conflict situations, and responses to 
the conflict may clarify many questions generated from the results of this study. 
Closing 
When negative events occur in the social environment, individuals look for causes 
and explanations of these events. Attribution theory corresponds with the area of 
research that explains the processes by which individuals explain the causes of other 
people's behaviors. This study is one of few whose results provide empirical support of 
how cultural value orientation plays a key role in the attribution processes including the 
perception of intentionality. The important point to be taken from this study is that 
culture and cultural value orientations are essential in understanding how individuals 
comprehend, form opinions and judgments about others behaviors, and interpret those 
behaviors. Attribution processes do not occur outside of the social environment, as 
individuals are not decontextualized from the social environment Individuals are 
embedded in a specific socio-cultural context that shapes how they learn to think about 
others, and how they behave and respond toward others. As such, culture and cultural 
value orientation is an essential-factor to be taken into consideration in studies on human 
behavior and human social interactions especially in a multicultural world. 
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1  Although subsequent analyses did not control for the effects of gender and 
ethnicity, there were additional models tested controlling for these covariates. 
Comparisons of all the models including the covariates and the models without the 
covariates revealed minor differences. The effects of the covariates were removed by 
obtaining the standardized residual scores of the main variables of the study, via 
Regression Analyses, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
program. The residual scores were obtained for individualism, collectivism, independent, 
interdependent self-construal, five items measuring perceptions of intentionality, three 
items for controllability, and two items for locus of control. These standardized residual 
scores were then tested in a structural equation modeling using EQS. 
A model similar to Figure 4 was tested. The results of this model revealed very 
little change from the model with the covariates included. However, some minor changes 
were in the strength of relations between paths. In particular, the significance of the path 
from individualism to interdependent self was slightly weaker (p< .05) in the covaried 
model than the model with the covariates contained (p< .02). Although not significant, 
the direction of the path from interdependent self to the perception of intentionality 
became negative in the covaried model. In general all other paths between variables and 
error terms remained similar in strength and in direction. 
A model similar to Figure 6 was tested with the effects of gender and ethnicity 
controlled. Again the results of this model also showed small changes from the model 
with the covariates included. Specifically, in the covaried model, the strength of relations 
from individualism to the interdependent self was stronger than the non-covaried model 
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(which seems to be reversed from the previous models). In general, the test of the 
covaried model showed the relations among all other variables and error terms remained 
similar in strength and in direction. 
Appendix A: Cover Letter 
Dear Student, 
I am a graduate student in the PhD Clinical Psychology program at Loma Linda 
University and I am inviting you to participate in a study on attribution theory. The 
purpose of this study is to gain additional knowledge in how people form opinions about 
other's behaviors. The Department of Psychology Institutional Review Board at 
California State University, San Bernardino has approved this study. 
Participation in this study is expected to take approximately 30-45 minutes. Involvement 
in this study requires the completion of a questionnaire. By participating in this study, the 
exposure to risk is minimal and the risk involved is no greater than what you encounter in 
everyday school activities. 
Your participation is completely voluntary and there is no penalty for not participating. If 
you choose not to participate in this investigation, you are excused and you may leave 
There may not be a direct benefit for you participating in this study, but you may receive 
extra credit by your professor. You may choose to withdraw from participating at any 
time without consequences. Your decision to decline to participate or to withdraw from 
the study at any time will not affect your class standing. 
Your responses to this questionnaire are strictly ANONYMOUS and will only be 
analyzed and presented as part of a larger group of respondents. 
I hope that you will decide to participate in this research. I believe that understanding 
more about culture and attribution processes is important to the knowledge and scientific 
study of psychology. Thank you for your time and consideration. 
If you have any further questions or concerns, you may contact the following people: 
Gangaw Zaw, Student Investigator, or Hector Betancouit, Ph.D Research Supervisor 
(909) 558-8577 at Loma Linda University or David Chavez, Ph.D Co-Investigator (909) 
880-5572 at California State University, San Bernardino. 
If you wish to contact an impartial third party, not associated with this study, regarding 
any concern or complaint about this study please contact the following: 
California State University Institutional Review Board at (909) 880-5027. 
By checking or initializing, and dating below, I acknowledge I have read the above 
information, I freely consent to participate in this study, and I am 18 years or older. 
I consent to participate in this study _I/ 
	 I decline to participate 	/ 	/ 	 
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6- 	-7 5 	 








6 	  7 




4. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do. 
1 	 2 	3 	4 	5 6 
Strongly Disagree 
reti ce my '' lusu benefit 	group. 	 
....... 	. .. 	.... 	.. ......... 	..... 	.. ....... 
-Strongly Ag  ree 
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6 5 4 3 
10. I often do my "own-thing". 




Appendix B: Collectivism and Individualism Scale 
RATE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS USING THE SCALE 
PRESENTED. CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER. 
2. Winning is everything. 
1 	 2 	3 
Strongly Disagree 
6. It is important to me that I do my job better than others. 








8. I enjoy working in situations involving competition. 
5 	 
Strongly Disagree 
	 Strongly Agree 





5 6 	7 
Strongly Agree 
12. Competition is the law of nature. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	 
Strongly Disagree 
5 6 	7 
Strongly Agree 
22. I rather depend on myself than others. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	 
Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Agree  
14. Being a unique individual is important to me. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 
Strongly Disagree 
•15. To me, 	pleasure iSs ending. time:with.others 	 . 	........... 




20. I am one of those people that emphasize winning. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	 
Strongly Disagree 
. . 	. 	. . 	. 	. 	. Strongly Disagree 	 
7 3 	4 5 	6 1 	2 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
 	Strongly Agree Strongly 	Disagree 	  
18. Without competition it is not possible to have a good society. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
7 
9. I feel  good when I cooperate with others. 
3-- 	 -4  -5 	7 
Strongly Agree  
21. 	It is 	important to me that  I respect decisions made by my group. 
1 	-2 	3 	4--- 	5-- . 	---6------ .... . ----7 
	Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree  
23. Family members should stick together,  no matter w 
1 	2 	 - - 	3 .. . ---4 	5 	 
at sacrifices are required. 
	6----------------7 




24. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others. . 








ren 	s .toge 
	
ossible.. .. . :••••••• .... .... ...... 	... ....  
26. My personal identity independent from others is very important to me. 
1 	2 	 3 	 4 	 5 	 6 	7 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
28. My personal identity is very important to me. 









30. I respect the majority's wishes in groups of which I am a member. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 
	
7 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
32. It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a 
decision. 








   
    
Strongly Agree 
34. I value the ideal sense of self as one who is harmonious with others. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
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36. I have been raised to attend to my own thoughts, behaviors and feelings. 
1 	2 	3 	4 5 	6 	7 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
fiU Continue on the next page 
...Having a lively imagination is importantitO ....  
-------- -----2 	3 	 4 	 
ogly,1004gtitt 
7. I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 
	
6 	7 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
uii comfortable with being singled out for 	praise:or.rewards.  	 
1   	2---------- - --3  	4  	5 .• 	6 7 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
Appendix C: Self-Construal Scale 
Please rate each of the following statements. 
1. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact. 
1 	2 
	
3 	4 	5 	6 
Strongly Disagree 





4 5  	7 
i,Sttongly.Pagree:    	::iStrongly Agree 










Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
4. Speaking  .up. during a.dass. is not aptoblemi.fOr me. 
1 	. 	.2 . --   	6 	 
:..strogbijDtsagree.:: 	 ............ 
	 Strongly Agree 
5. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 
	
7 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 












Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
. 	................ ............................................... 
0 
	
tam the:same.p.erg:Oii, :at home that I am at ,§Chool. 
	4- --- 	5 	 
 	DiSagf& .. 	 
11. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 







21. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible. 





than my own accomplishments. 




Strongly Agree trongly isagree ..  
- 	. .. 4 	: : : 	 5... 
13. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important 
15. I act the same way no matter whom I am with. 
1 5 7 3 6 2 4 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
........ 
. ......... .. 
isagree 	  Strong].) 
	 . 	6--- 	............ 
:Strongly: Agree 
17. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group. 
3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
Strongly Agree 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
4 3 1 	2 
19. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. 
5 	6 	 7 
. 	 . 	. 	 Strongly 	Agree 
4 	 6 	 7 
trongly Disagree  
1 	2 
Strongly Disagree 
ers;:is, v.ery,i.toport4n.to me• 	
Strongly Agree 
Strongly Disagree 
23. Even when I strongly disagree with the group members, I avoid an argument. 
1 	 2 	3 	4 5 	6 	 7 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
25. 	I believe the self exists in relation to others. 




6 	 7 
Strongly Agree 
 
26-: 1 believe. the .8e. 
. 	 .. 	.:.::. 	.7 - 
	
StronglyDisagree:: 	 • : - Strotigiy Agree 	
Continue on the next page 
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Appendix D: Description of Conflict 
Directions: In the space provided below, please describe in a few 
words a negative conflict situation you have encountered with one 
other individual within the last year. 
The next set of questions will refer to the conflict situation you have 
described above. 
1. When did the conflict happen? 
a. Within the last week 
b. A week to a month ago 
c. A month to 6 months ago 
d. 6 months to 1 year 
e. More than 1 year ago: 
(Specify the year it happened) 	  
2. Who did the conflict involve? Describe the nature of the relationship you have 
with the individual you had the conflict with. 
a. Friend 
b. Spouse 
c. Boyfriend or Girlfriend 
d. Sibling 
e. Parent: 	Mother 	Father 
f. Other Family (specify):  
g. Person from School (specify): 	  
h. Person from Work (specify):  
i. Person in a Public Setting (specify): 	  
j. Others in general (specify): 	  
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3. Would you consider the individual you had the conflict with as part of a close group 
of friends, family, or another group you consider yourself a member of? 
	No 
Yes, please explain. Describe characteristics of the person (e.g. age, ethnicity, race, 
gender, etc...) 
4. Indicate where the conflict occurred. 
5. I feel the conflict situation I described was a 	 experience. 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
Negative 	 Neutral Positive 
6. Indicate if you believe the conflict was resolved. 	Yes 	No 
7. Indicate if you believe the outcome of the conflict was 	  
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
Negative 
	 Neutral Positive 
8. In general, the family I grew up in views conflict as a 	 experience: 
1 	2 
 
4 	5 	6 	7 
 
Negative 
	 Neutral Positive 
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9. Did the conflict upset you? 




po,yQu.bOgyq that .what. .t4e...imsop.  did was intentional (the person wanted to do it or 
wanted to causethe.Eirt040rit tatleact-i.td.he::-:q.Otion)? 
2.........................................3 	 4 	5 	 6 	7  
8. Do you think there was something the person could have done to avoid it? 
1 	2 	3   .4 	 5 	6 	 .7 Definitely could have done 
something to avoid it Could do nothing to avoid it 
was in control of his or her actions/behavior?  
1....... 	... 	.2 	 
Not at all in control 
	3 	  4. 5 .   	6 	7 
Definitely in control 
6. Do you think the action/behavior was something the person could influence? 
1 	 2   	3  	4   	5 	 6 
	7 
Definitely could influence Could not influence at all 
5.: Do you think it was .deliberate? 
1. 	 2, 	. 	3 	 .4 	 5  	6...........7 
Not at all deliberate 	 Definitely deliberate 
11. Do you think the outcome was directed at you? 
1. 	2  	3 	 4... 5  	6 	
7 
Definitely directed at me Not at all directed at me 
. . 	6 	 .....7 
Definitely on purpose 
12. Do you think it was done on purpose? 
Not at 
2. Do you think it was meant to cause the outcome (to hurt you or cause you damage)? 
1 	 2  	3  	4   	5  	6 	7 
Not at all meant to cause the outcome 
	 Definitely meant to cause the outcome 
Appendix E: Attribution Emotion Scale 
Consider the conflict scenario you just described. Answer 
the following questions based on what you believe about 
the person's actions. Circle ONE number to describe what you think. 
Not Intentional 
	 Definitely Intentional 
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3. Do you think the person's behavior was pre-planned? 
1 	2 	3 	  4 	5 	6 	7 
Definitely Pre-planned Not at al/ 
Pre-planned 
4. Do you think there was something others could have done to avoid it? 
Nothing anyone 
could have done-
.. something . 
Please indicate who yo 
others 
Definitely others could 
have done 
of when asked about 
9. Do you think the action. was influenced.by others? 




Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about 
others 	  
10. Do you think others had control over the person's action? 
1 ...... 	2 	3  	4 	 5   6.   	7 
Others definitely had control 
Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about 
others 
Others did not have control 
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11. Was this cause something about the person? 
1 	 .2 	 3. . 4 	 5 	 .6 	 .7 
Definitely about the person Not at all about the person 
as this cause something within 
3 
Not at all internal  
	 .6   	7 
Definitely internal 
et-son? 
2. Was this cause something about the situation or circumstances? 
1 	 2  	3  	4 	5 	.6 	7 
Not at all about the situation 
	 Definitely about the situation 
..7 
Definitely could influence . 	.  
• 
Could not influence at all 
3. Was this cause something 	person could influence? 
4. Could the person control this cause? 
1. 	2  	3 	 4  	5 	6...... 7 
Definitely could control No control at all 
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Now think again about the conflict situation referred to above. In 
your opinion, why did the person do this? In the space below, write 
down what you believe was the ACTUAL CAUSE OR REASON 
for what the person did. Please write it down in the space provided. 
I
Answer the following questions based on the cause you just described 
above.  
Circle ONE number to describe what you think.  
5. Was this cause something external to the person? 
1  	2 	 3 	 4 	 5 	.6  	7 
Not at all external to the person 
	 Definitely external to the person 
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5  	6 	7 
Definitely changeable 1  	
.2 	 .3 .4.   
Not at all changeable 
Others could not influence at all 
8. Was this cause something others could influence? 
1.  	2 	3 	 4 	5 	6  	7 
Others could definitely influence 
.............. 
*Other.c. cOuld 
nothave controlled at a 
9. Could others have controlled this  cause? 
ndicate who you were thinking of when asked about 
others 
..Definitely others.Coyld have controlled 
Please i 
7. Was there 	ing'i;tl*OrS'OAitoW:CI:Hhave.ldone about this cause? 
....   .. 	5 	 ... 	6     ..... ...7 
Definitely could do something Could do nothing at all 
Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about 
others 
10. Was there something others could have done about the cause? 
1 . 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
Nothing others could 
have done 
Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about 
others 
Definitely something 
others could have done 
11. Is this cause something temporary? 
1 ... 	2  	3 	4 	5 	6 	 7 Definitely temporary Not at all temporary 
5. 	 . 6 	7 
Definitely stable over time Not at all stable over time 
2. Is this cause so 
. 	 . 
methirig stable over tinie? 
13. Is this cause something that can change in the future? 
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Please think about how you felt toward the person as a result of the 
conflict. Circle ONE number to indicate how much you experienced 
the following emotions. 
1. Did the conflict upset you? 
1 	2 	3 	 
Not at all 
4............5 	6 	.7 
Very much 
2. Did you feel irritation toward the person? 
1 	2 	3   	4............5  	6 	7 
Very much 
3. Were you frustrated by the person's behavior? 
1 	2 	3 	4 	 5 	 
Not at all  
6 	.7 
Very much 
4. Did the person's behavior make ou feel angry? 
1 	2 	3 	4............5 	 
Not at all  
6 	7 
Very much 
5. Were you enraged by the person's behavior? 
1 	2 	3 	4............5 	 
Not at all  
6 	7 
Very much 
6. Did you experience hostility towards the person? 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	 .6 	7 
Very much 
7. Did you feel compassion for the person? 
4 	5 	 6   7 
Very much 
8. Did you feel sympathetic toward the person? 
1 	2 	3.........4  	5.............6 	 
Not at all 
9. Did you feel pity for the person? 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	 6 	7 
Not at all 
Not at all 
Not at all 
1 	2 	3 





10. Did you feel sorry for the person? 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 
	
6 	7 
Not at all Very much 
11. Did you feel sad about the person's behavior? 
1 	2  	3 4............5  
	
6 	7 
Not at all Very much 
12. Did the person's behavior make you feel alone after the conflict? 
1... 	2 	3 	4 	5.............6  	7 
Not at all Very much 
13. Did the person's behavior depress you? 
1... 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
Not at all Very much 
14. Did the person's behavior make you feel shameful? 
	2 	3 	4 	5 	6   7 
Not at all Very much 
15. Did you feel embarrassed by the person's behavior? 
1... 	2... 	3 	4 	5 	6  	7 
Not at all Very much 
16. Did the person's behavior make you feel guilty? 
1...2   3..........4  	5 	. 	.6 ... 	7 
Not at all 	 Very much 
mf---> Continue on the next page 
Appendix F: Demographics 
Please provide us with some general information about yourself. 
Age __ _ 
Gender: Male Female --� ---
Which of the following best represents your ethnic background? 
D Anglo-American (Non-Latino) 
0 African American 
D Latino-American (specify) 
0 Other (please specify) 
0 Asian-American (specify): 
Were you born in the United States? ___ Yes No 
If no, indicate the year you immigrated to the United States _____ _ 
Are you bi-lingual? ___ Yes: ___________ (language spoken)
No 
Marital Status (Check the appropriate response) 
0 Single (never married) 
0 Divorced or Separated 
0 Widowed 
0 Married (how long?) 
Name of your institution _____________ _ 
College major _______________ _
Current occupation ___________ _ 
What is your religious orientation/ preference? 
D Christian (Catholic, Protestant) 
D Jewish 
0 Muslim 
D None/ No Preference 
0 Buddhist 
D Hindu 
0 Other (please spectfy) 
Stop! You have completed 
the questionnaire. 
Thank vou. 
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